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ABSTRACT
JAMES FRANKLIN BELL: HARD WAR IN THE PHILIPPINES
Daniel Michael
11/21/2017

This thesis surveys the military history of the Philippine-American War of 18991902. In particular, this thesis looks at that war through the lens of hard war as a way of
war. It begins with an introduction to hard war as a concept and a historiography of the
Philippine-American War and continues with an overview of the events leading up to the
war. The first two chapters deal with the wider role of the U.S. Army during the war,
while the third chapter examines the role of James Franklin Bell, and American officer,
and his command of the Third Separate Brigade in Batangas Province. This thesis is an
attempt to place the Philippine-American War into the discussion of hard war in
American military history.
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INTRODUCTION
Between 1899 and 1902, the U.S. Army fought an often-overlooked war to
establish American control of the Philippines. The Philippine-American War followed
the Spanish-American War, but despite being larger in scale, the Philippine-American
War has been called a “hidden war.”1 This is not for lack of involvement, because at its
height 70,000 U.S. troops were stationed in the Philippines. When President Theodore
Roosevelt finally declared victory in July 1902, the U.S. Army’s mission was not
finished. America was only beginning its colonial rule of the Philippines, which lasted
until the Second World War and included a sizable U.S. military presence on the islands.
Despite the U.S. declaration of victory, combat operations to pacify the Philippines
continued well past 1902. The Army had pacified the Northern and largely Catholic
segments of the Philippines but still fought a campaign against the Muslim Moro people
in the Southern Philippines until 1913.2
The Philippine-American War should not be remembered as a sidebar to the
Spanish-American War. It is far more complex. In fact, while the Spanish-American War
remained limited in scope and only lasted a few months, American fighting in the

1

Leon Wolff, Little Brown Brother: How the United States Purchased and Pacified the Philippine Islands
at the Century’s Turn (New York, N.Y.: History Book Club, 2006), ix.
2
James R. Arnold, The Moro War: How America Battled a Muslim Insurgency in the Philippine Jungle,
1902-1913, First Edition (Bloomsbury Press, 2011). For further reading on the Moro War, see James
Arnold’s work on the subject.
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Philippines was larger in scale and turned into counter-insurgnecy warfare lasting for
years. Because the Army adapted to fight a hard war3 in the Philippines in response to an
insurgency, the war was not an exception to the American way of war – and certainly was
not just about garrison duty. Instead, this paper will argue that the Philippine-American
War shows how the U.S. Army resorted to hard war in order to achieve victory after
decisive battles did not defeat the Filipinos.
Of the American commanders in the Philippine-American War, James Franklin
Bell is perhaps the clearest practitioner of hard war tactics. Bell was not only a model
soldier – he won a Medal of Honor in 1899 for single-handedly capturing several Filipino
insurgents while leading a patrol – he was also a career soldier who conducted a
successful counterinsurgency campaign in Batangas province between December 1901
and May 1902. His campaign ended Filipino resistance in the region and was hailed by
Bell’s peers. However, he was also criticized for the hardships the campaign placed on
the Filipino people. This thesis will show how the Philippine-American War became a
hard war, and how James Franklin Bell practiced hard war in Batangas province.
WAYS OF HARD WAR
Understanding hard war and how it fits into the idea of an American way of war
requires context. One of the groundbreaking works arguing for an American way of war
was published in 1973. Russell Weigley’s The American Way of War: A History of
United States Military Strategy and Policy examined American military history from the

3

The terms “hard war” and “American way of war” will be explained and discussed further in the
introduction.
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American Revolution to the Vietnam War.4 For Weigley, the U.S. Civil War ushered in a
new period of American warfare. When General Sherman took his Union forces on the
infamous March to the Sea in late 1864 – destroying railroads, taking food and livestock,
and burning houses and barns - thus making Southerners "feel the hard hand of war," he
also shaped an American way of war that, later fully realized, became total war. The
U.S. military began to shift from waging wars of attrition to waging wars of annihilation.
From the Civil War onward, military strategy utilized full mobilization of society and the
economy to achieve total victory. For Weigley, such an American way of war only
emerged once the nation had sufficient military power, following the industrialization of
the economy and after a strong federal state had developed. Earlier conflicts, on the other
hand, were limited by the scope of America’s military capability.5
Weigly’s thesis, though, relied on two kinds of war: limited war and a complete
overthrow of the enemy.6 Yet American military history is filled with examples, as even
Weigley admits, that do not neatly fit into those two categories. Mark Grimsley’s book,
The Hard Hand of War:Union Military Policy Toward Southern Civilians 1861-1865,7
argued instead that Union treatment of Southern noncombatants blended a mix of
destruction aimed at civilian property and the Southern economy, while exercising
restraint for the actual lives of Southern civilians. Initially, Grimsely argues, the Union
adopted a conciliatory policy towards the South. This policy changed over time towards

4

Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977).
5
Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977), xx–xxiii.
6
Ibid., xx–xxi.
7
Mark Grimsley, The Hard Hand of War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
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coercion, and Sherman’s raid became a centerpiece by using destruction aimed at the
Southern economy while maintaining a degree of restraint.8
In fact, Grimsley offers a definition of hard war that applies just as much to Bell
in the Philippine–American War as it does to Generals Sherman or Sheridan during the
U.S. Civil War: “The erosion of the enemy’s will to resist by deliberately or
concomitantly subjecting the civilian population to the pressures of war.”9 And while the
Union army had a wide range of acceptable targets, it understood limits to its destruction.
Both in the Civil War, as Grimsley argued, and during Bell’s campaign in the Philippines
the U.S. Army was willing to resort to hard war.10
Unlike Weigley, Brian Linn in his The Echo of Battle: The Army’s Way of War 11
in 2007 argued that "small" and “unconventional wars” – and not just major conflicts
such as the U.S. Civil War or peacetime defense policies and strategies – also shaped the
American way of war. Similarly, Max Boot’s 2002 book The Savage Wars of Peace:
Small Wars and the Rise of American Power12 also examined wars that were small in
scale. Even more important, as Boot argued, these types of conflicts occurred far more
often than those major conflicts that Weigley and many others most often identified with
the American way of war. Boot thereby used a nineteenth-century British officer’s
definition to explain small wars as “campaigns undertaken to suppress rebellions and

8

Ibid., 208–15.
Ibid., 5.
10
Ibid., 4–5.
11
Brian McAllister Linn, The Echo of Battle: The Army’s Way of War (Cambridge, Mass. ; London:
Harvard University Press, 2007).
12
Max Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power, Revised Edition
(New York: Basic Books, 2014).
9
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guerrilla warfare in all parts of the world where organized armies are struggling against
opponents who will not meet them in the open field.”13
While Grimsley, Boot, and Linn offered nuance or counterpoint to Weigley’s
thesis, a more recent work set out to cover territory uncharted by Weigley. In 2008 John
Grenier added his work, The First Way of War: American Warmaking on the Frontier.14
In it, Grenier argued that colonial and early national American ways of war had a distinct
nature. These wars even approached the wars of annihilation that Weigley contended
only emerged later in American history. Grenier made the case that English colonists and
early Americans carried out extirpative war against American Indians. When colonists
struggled to defeat American Indians in battle, they resorted to attacking non-combatants,
villages, and food supplies. This kind of war resembled hard war, and at points became
war of annihilation.15
Hard war in the American lexicon became defined as a rejection of conventional
battles between armies, instead granting legitimacy to attacking the enemy’s economy
and inflicting hardship upon civilians.16 As General Philip Sheridan stated,
“Death is popularly considered the maximum of punishment in
war, but it is not; reduction to poverty brings prayers for peace more
surely and more quickly than does the destruction of human life, as the
selfishness of man has demonstrated in more than one great conflict.”17

13

Ibid., xvii.
John Grenier, The First Way of War: American War Making on the Frontier, 1607-1814, First Edition
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
15
See also, Linn, The Echo of Battle, 69.
16
Matthew Carr, Sherman’s Ghosts: Soldiers, Civilians, and the American Way of War (New York: The
New Press, 2015), 28.
17
Ibid, 27–28.
14
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Almost 40 years before Bell, General William Sherman carried out this type of
war in the South during the American Civil War. He attacked the southern economy
directly, even ignoring the major Confederate forces left operating against him.
Contemporary to Sherman, General Sheridan carried out a similar campaign in the
Shenandoah Valley in mid-1864. Prior to the Civil War, both Sherman and Sheridan had
experienced the nation’s frontier way of war, as they each fought against American
Indians and served in garrison duty. They brought this experience to the Civil War and
adapted lessons from the frontier to their campaigns against the South.18 They attacked
the enemy's economy, logistics, and stamina, not just the enemy's army. And they
maneuvered to break not only the South's ability but also the South's will to fight.19
In the American West in the nineteenth century, the government also pursued
policies designed to control Native Americans by limiting their movement and destroying
one of their main food sources, buffalo. This indirect way of dealing with Native
Americans was devastating to their population and greatly reduced their ability to fight.
Two 2016 books demonstrate the way that the U.S. Army conducted warfare against
Native Americans. Peter Cozzens’ The Earth is Weeping: The Epic Story of the Indian
Wars for the American West 20 and David Silverman’s Thundersticks: Firearms and the
Violent Transformation of Native America 21 both demonstrate the hard wars that the
Army carried out on the frontier. As Silverman contends, native warriors could contend

18

Linn, The Echo of Battle, 75–76.
Carr, Sherman’s Ghosts, 54–59.
20
Peter Cozzens, The Earth Is Weeping: The Epic Story of the Indian Wars for the American West, First
Edition (New York: Knopf, 2016).
21
David J. Silverman, Thundersticks: Firearms and the Violent Transformation of Native America
(Cambridge, Massachusetts ; London, England: Belknap Press: An Imprint of Harvard University Press,
2016).
19
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with the U.S. cavalry when close to even terms, but they could not resist the damage done
when the Army attacked their people, homes, and food.22
The campaigns of the Civil War and the American West were well known to Bell.
He graduated from West Point in the decades following the Civil War and was twice
assigned to the infamous 7th Cavalry Regiment. As this thesis argues, Bell is linked to a
wider American way of war by his own hard war that he waged against the Philippine
Insurrection in the winter of 1901-1902. He directed force against the insurgent’s civilian
support. Bell gained control of the population by forcing them into U.S. controlled
“reconcentration zones” and attacked the Filipinos' ability to wage war by destroying
their resources, especially food.
The following pages will show how Bell’s campaign in Batangas was an example
of hard war and how the Philippine-American war evolved into that level of conflict.
While it stopped short of the extirpative wars against American Indians, it moved far
beyond a limited war. Bell’s campaign in Batangas defeated one of the last major Filipino
holdouts, but also brought terrible suffering to the Filipino population. By exposing
civilians to the violence of the conflict, Bell and the U.S. Army resorted to a strategy
common to other American wars, both before and after it. Hard war in American military
history can trace its roots to the colonial era, and Bell’s campaign was another step in that
long line of hard wars. Bell represents a common thread running through many
American conflicts.

22

Ibid., 2.
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OUTLINE
This thesis is a case study of the Philippine-American War as a hard war and
James Franklin Bell's key role in this conflict. Far from a simple handover from Spain or
occupational duty for the American Army, the conflict in the Philippines was a complex
and violent undertaking. However, because of the limited scope of this project, the
following chapters will not explore in full the Filipino Army23 and insurrection in its
entirety.24 As much as they deserve scholarly work, this thesis is about the U.S. and Bell's
role in the conflict. This thesis is neither about American public opinion about the war,
nor foreign policy at home.25 Similarly, it would have been outside the scope of this
project to deal fully with national26 or individual identity27 in this conflict.
This paper is primarily about American military operations in the Philippines
during 1898-1902, as such it avoids many other interesting and relevant topics which
deserve treatment. However, one important topic cannot be avoided because of how
thoroughly embedded in the subject it became. Race and the racism of the day were
central to American understandings of the war. This was a racially charged conflict. 28
Both in the way that American soldiers dealt with Filipinos and in the administration’s

23

Luis Camara Dery, The Army of the First Philippine Republic and Other Historical Essays (Malate,
Manila, Philippines: De La Salle University Press, 1995).
24
O. D. Corpuz, The Roots of the Filipino Nation. Two Volumes, 2nd Edition (Aklahi Foundation, Inc.,
1989).
25
Richard E. Welch, Response to Imperialism: The United States and the Philippine-American War, 18991902, First Edition (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1979).
26
Stanley Karnow, In Our Image: America’s Empire in the Philippines, 1989.
27
Kristin L. Hoganson, Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the SpanishAmerican and Philippine-American Wars, 6th Edition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000).
28
Willard B. Gatewood Jr, Black Americans and the White Man’s Burden, 1898-1903, First Edition
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1975).
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policies towards the islands. From enlisted men to general officers, soldiers viewed the
Filipinos as lesser and frequently stated so explicitly. It is important to remember these
attitudes when discussing the level of destruction that American soldiers carried out
during the war and the lack of punishment for the excesses that came with that
destruction.
Officials and the public back home did not consider the Filipinos capable of selfrule which went hand in hand with the imperialism of the time. Racism towards, and
mistreatment of Filipinos created contradictions for African-Americans, both in the
United States and those that were ordered to the Philippines as part of segregated units.
Observing a country that was unwilling to treat them as citizens, they had to also fight to
expand control over other people who Americans did not treat as equal.29
What the reader will encounter is an account of the Philippine-American War
centered around James Franklin Bell. The first chapter is an overview of how the war
began, from the Battle of Manila Bay in May,1898 until the dissolution of the Filipino
Revolutionary Army in December 1899. The second chapter is an examination of how
the war changed from a conventional conflict between two standing armies in 1899 into a
guerrilla or counter-insurgency war in early 1900. This chapter examines the American
response to that shift and concludes by showing how the Americans found success by the
summer of 1901. The third chapter is an examination of James Franklin Bell's hard war
in Batangas Province in Southern Luzon between December 1901 and May 1902.

29

David J. Silbey, A War of Frontier and Empire: The Philippine-American War, 1899-1902, First Edition
(New York: Hill and Wang, 2008), 108-109.
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Together the three chapters will show that the Philippine-American War might
have begun as a conventional conflict, limited in scope, but soon became a
counterinsurgency war when the defeat of the Filipino Revolutionary Army failed to end
resistance to U.S. occupation. The U.S. then fought this new conflict by resorting to hard
war tactics, taken to their fullest measure by James Franklin Bell in Batangas province.
In both this introduction and throughout, this thesis uses the term PhilippineAmerican War.30 But the name Philippine-American War describes more than one
unified event. Initially, the conflict involved Filipinos and Americans fighting together.
During the period from February 1899 until December 1899, two organized field armies
fought each other in conventional terms. By 1900, the war had turned into a guerrilla war
as Filipino leadership dissolved their field army in the face of severe losses. Where
applicable, this thesis uses the name Filipino Revolutionary Army. However, because of
the nature of the war after December 1899, the thesis introduces the terms insurrection,
insurgents, or insurgency to describe Filipino combatants. Another term, pacification, is
how journalists, soldiers, and even those at home referred to the war at the time.31 The
common usage of both pacification and insurrection influenced the decision to use those
terms, even if they do not fully represent the nature of the conflict. This thesis does not
intend to glorify the American Army or Bell's success in the war. Instead, it will attempt
to argue that the success they achieved was linked to the kind of war they fought. The
thesis will also argue that although this may be a limited study of operations and tactics in

30

David J. Silbey, A War of Frontier and Empire: The Philippine-American War, 1899-1902, First Edition
(New York: Hill and Wang, 2008), i–xviii. For additional discussion of the issues surrounding how
historians refer to the conflict Silbey’s introduction offers a thoughtful analysis.
31
Gregg Jones, Honor in the Dust: Theodore Roosevelt, War in the Philippines, and the Rise and Fall of
America’s Imperial Dream, First Edition (New York: NAL, 2012), 204.
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one American conflict at the end of the nineteenth century. Bell’s campaign sheds light
on and offers lessons about other U.S. conflicts.
SOURCES AND HISTORIOGRAPHY
For primary material, this thesis relied on Bell’s papers, which are housed at the
U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania.32 The documents in the collection are
his original telegraphic circulars, written commands to subordinates as a General Officer
that dictated how Bell fought a counter-insurgency. Bell’s orders show how he
implemented hard war in Batangas Province, and while they are only limited to his
official role and not his personal writings, he details both the reasoning behind his orders
along with the specifics of how his subordinates should carry them out.
Various regimental histories appeared throughout the first half of the twentieth
century, but 1939 saw the first history of the Philippine-American War. William Sexton
published his work Soldiers in the Sun: An Adventure in Imperialism that year.33 Sexton
largely defended American actions in the Philippines and he attributed American military
success to the capabilities of junior officers and enlisted soldiers. He acknowledged that
there were some excesses by American troops, but that they were limited in scale. He
asserted that the reconcentration camps were humane and that suffering could be blamed
on continued resistance but did not attribute the use of reconcentration zones as a
deciding factor in the conflict. Sexton’s work is predominantly a traditional military

32

James Franklin Bell, Adna Romanza Chaffee, and Lloyd Wheaton, James Franklin Bell Papers, 1902,
U.S. Army Military History Institute.
33
Sexton, William T., Soldiers in the Sun: An Adventure in Imperialism (Harrisburg, PA: The Military
Service Publishing Company, 1939).
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history but it is among the only histories written within the lifetimes of the veterans of the
war.
The next major historical work on the Philippine-American War was Leon
Wolff’s Little Brown Brother: How the United States Purchased and Pacified the
Philippine Islands at the Century’s Turn.34 First published in 1961, Wolff’s work was a
more comprehensive study of the war, if still incomplete. Wolff painted the war in stark
terms and even went so far as to declare it a “moral wrong.”35 In both Wolff’s and
Sexton’s works, the books ended before the war did; that is to say, they recount the war
until Aguinaldo’s capture. The events after that date, including Bell’s campaign in
Batangas, were not discussed at length but rather became mere epilogues.
A counter point to Wolff emerged in 1973 when John Gates authored
Schoolbooks and Krags: The United States Army in the Philippines 1898-1902.36 Gates
acknowledged the damage done to the Army’s reputation and understood the popular
image of the Army in the Philippines as one of widespread misconduct. His work argued
for a different image of the Army, one of both military and humanitarian work during the
conflict. Gates attributed America’s successful pacification of the islands to the ability of
American military and civil governors to win over Filipinos through public
improvements as much as he credits American military action.

34

Leon Wolff, Little Brown Brother: How the United States Purchased and Pacified the Philippine Islands
at the Century’s Turn (New York, N.Y.: History Book Club, 2006).
35
Ibid., 366.
36
John M. Gates, Schoolbooks and Krags: The United States Army in the Philippines, 1898-1902, First
Edition (Westport, Conn: Praeger, 1973).
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While not as broad as some areas of military history, secondary literature on the
Philippine-American War was forthcoming. By the 1990s, authors began to write more
focused works on the war. An example highly relevant to this thesis is Glenn May’s
Battle for Batangas: A Philippine Province at War, 37 which he published in 1991. May
did not cast his book as merely another military history. Instead, May’s work studied the
movement that opposed the Americans in that province.
May determined that the role of the U.S. Army in Batangas is somewhere
between the benevolent peacekeepers and ruthless counter-insurgents previously
portrayed, but that the Army ultimately still caused the civilian loss of life in Batangas.
He argued that Bell’s campaign compounded already serious food shortages and
environmental factors that led to high numbers of civilian deaths. His study included a
deeper examination of the Filipino resistance than many other works, although it was
limited to one region, and concluded that local elites led the resistance. Once they
realized the benefit to be gained from accepting American rule and saw the disastrous
effects of further fighting, they worked within American rule rather than against it.
In more recent years, several authors have added to the literature on the
Philippine-American War. Most notably, Brian Linn wrote two books: The Philippine
War 1899-1902 38 and The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War,
1899-1902.39 Linn made a case for the Philippines not as a war of terror, but as a local

37

Glenn Anthony May, Battle for Batangas: A Philippine Province at War, First Edition (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1991).
38
Brian McAllister Linn, The Philippine War, 1899-1902 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000).
39
Brian McAllister Linn, The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899-1902, First
Edition (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000).
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war that varied widely among villages, towns, and provinces throughout the Philippines.
Linn added to the scholars arguing a case for the American military outperforming the
Filipinos on the battlefield and balancing combat with social reform to win over
Filipinos.
Worthy of mention, several of these books have drawn comparisons to counterinsurgency wars, including those in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Some books have
even placed the Philippine-American War within the wider context of twentieth-century
insurgency warfare like James Arnold’s Jungle of Snakes: A Century of CounterInsurgency Warfare from the Philippines to Iraq.40 Even writers within the military
began reassessing the Philippine-American War as the U.S. Army was engaged in two
counter-insurgency wars during the 2000s. Two prime examples beings Lessons From a
Successful Counterinsurgency: The Philippines, 1899-1902 by Timothy Deady41 and All
Wars are Local: Lessons From the Philippine Insurrection by Todd Brost.42
To compare the Philippine-American War with prior U.S. conflicts, historians
need to look at works like Matthew Carr’s Sherman’s Ghosts: Soldiers, Civilians, and the
American Way of War.43 Carr’s book does not a directly examine the PhilippineAmerican War. Rather he relates Sherman’s hard war to other American conflicts. Carr
drew a link between the Civil War and the Philippine-American War. In another recent
work, Max Boot wrote Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American

40

James R. Arnold, Jungle of Snakes: A Century of Counterinsurgency Warfare from the Philippines to
Iraq, First Edition (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2009).
41
Timothy K. Deady, “Lessons from a Successful Counterinsurgency: The Philippines, 1899-1902” (DTIC
Document, 2005)
42
Todd Brost, “All Wars Are Local: Lessons from the Philippine Insurrection” (DTIC Document, 2009).
43
Carr, Sherman’s Ghosts, 2015.
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Power 44 in order to examine the ways that the smaller conflicts throughout our history
have shaped the American way of war. Boot placed the Philippines in the context of
conflicts like the Barbary Wars or American interventions in Central and South America.
Ultimately the historiography of the Philippine-American war has centered on reexamining the U.S. Army’s role in the conflict, and this thesis has much in common with
that theme.

44

Max Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power, Revised Edition
(New York: Basic Books, 2014).
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CHAPTER 1: CONVENTIONAL WAR
Early on the morning on May 1st, 1898 Commodore George Dewey ordered the
captain of the USS Olympia to open fire on the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay in the
Philippines. This naval battle sparked U.S. involvement in the Philippines for the next
half century. On paper, the forces were roughly equal, seven ships to a side. The
Spanish also had some supporting artillery on the island of Corregidor. However, the
Spanish ships were obsolete and outgunned compared to Dewey’s modern armored
cruisers. The Spanish commander had recognized his low chances of victory and had
placed his ships in shallow water in the hope of giving his sailors the opportunity to swim
ashore. His fears proved well founded, as accurate American gunfire destroyed his fleet.
The casualty list showed similar results, 371 Spanish casualties to nine American
wounded and one American dead from heatstroke. Dewey's victory at Manila Bay turned
him into a national hero and put America on a path to further involvement in the
Philippines that would lead to the Philippine-American War the following year.45
The Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars would open a new chapter
in American military history. The major campaigns of the Plains Wars against Native
Americans were over. For many soldiers and officers, the coming conflict would be an
opportunity after years of career stagnation. For the country, it was a chance to step onto

45

David J. Silbey, A War of Frontier and Empire: The Philippine-American War, 1899-1902, First Edition
(New York: Hill and Wang, 2008), 37–39.
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the world's stage. For James Franklin Bell the Philippine-American War propelled his
career from a circuit riding garrison lieutenant and teacher into a Medal of Honor
recipient and, eventually, U.S. Army Chief of Staff.
Bell had been born in the town of Shelbyville, Kentucky in 1856, just a few years
before the Civil War. He attended West Point and graduated in 1878, first posted to the
9th Cavalry Regiment and within months to the 7th Cavalry Regiment. He spent his
years between graduation and his assignment to the Philippines in various stations in the
Western United States. He spent time guarding railroads, teaching, serving as a judge
advocate, and in garrisons from Arizona to South Dakota.46 Only a few pictures of Bell
exist, but one is from his time as a lieutenant at Pine Ridge Indian Reservation with the
7th Cavalry Regiment taken in 1890, although Bell was on leave at the time of the
Massacre of Wounded Knee.47 When the Spanish-American War broke out Bell received
orders that attached him to General Wesley Merrit's command as a Major of Volunteers.
Bell distinguished himself, and by the end of the Philippine-American War he would be
one of the Army's most respected commanders and the archetype of an American officer
during the period.
From the outset, American actions in the Philippines lacked direction as policy
from Washington was either unclear or not communicated in time. Dewey had won a
victory, but at least for a time, no one seemed sure what to do with it. War then erupted
between the Filipinos and Americans before a well-defined American policy emerged –

46

“James Franklin Bell,” accessed December 30, 2016, http://www.history.army.mil/books/CG&CSA/BellJF.htm.
47
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and it was really the U.S. Army and Navy which drove the Mckinley Administration's
decisions about the islands and not the other way around. The initial successes by
American forces also masked the formation of a Filipino guerrilla army that would soon
fight an insurgency against the Americans until 1902.
Before American involvement in the Philippines, Filipinos had been in revolt
against Spanish colonial rule. The Philippines of the 1880s and 1890s had suffered
economic hardship, crop and livestock loss, and disease. These conditions created an
environment for dissatisfaction and dissension. This cultural climate spawned a Filipino
revolution in the mid-1890s against Spanish rule. The revolutionaries that emerged were
groups that shared a common enemy but otherwise were split by longstanding class and
ethnic divisions. The Tagalog people were one of the most influential ethnic groups of
the revolution. One of their own, Emilio Aguinaldo, emerged as a leader that represented
their interests in overthrowing Spanish rule but would keep the power among wealthy
Filipino landowners. Another significant faction in the Filipino revolution was the
Katipunan. This group consisted of farmers and merchants from the cities and was led by
Andres Bonifacio.
The competition between these groups hindered the revolt, and by 1897 Spain had
gained the upper hand. Emilio Aguinaldo demonstrated skill as a politician and was
elected president of the revolutionary government. His ascension to leadership marked
trouble for his rival Bonifacio. Aguinaldo ordered Bonifacio to be arrested on
accusations of treason and executed him. Later Aguinaldo claimed that he, in fact, had
commuted Bonifacio’s death sentence, but that the order to stay the execution had not
arrived in time. Despite Aguinaldo’s clear leadership of the revolutionary forces, they
18

still struggled to make gains against the Spanish. By August of 1897, the two sides began
negotiations. These negotiations resulted in a treaty which ended the revolution in
exchange for payment to the Filipino revolutionary leaders whom Spain exiled to Hong
Kong. Neither side stayed faithful to its treaty obligations. The Spanish only paid half of
what they promised, and Aguinaldo placed much of the money into a bank account to
fund later revolutionary efforts.48
While Aguinaldo waited for a chance to resume his revolution in the Philippines,
the Spanish-American War broke out on the other side of the world. This new war was
the result of another revolt against Spanish rule. At the time, Cuba was one of the last
Caribbean holdings of the dwindling Spanish empire. Cuban revolutionaries had proven
more successful in their fight against Spain. In response to a more aggressive and
effective insurgency in Cuba, the Spanish responded with stringent measures. The
governor of Cuba was Valeriano Weyler, and among the policies that he implemented to
quell the revolt was one known as Reconcentrado.49
Under this policy, Cuban civilians were forcibly moved by the Spanish military
into zones that the Spanish controlled. Spanish officials were unable to keep a steady
food supply to these areas which led to malnourishment and starvation. Weyler's
Reconcentrado caused considerable outrage in the United States. In the winter of 190102, as a General, James Franklin Bell instated a similar policy to combat the Filipino
insurgency, anti-imperialists decried his policies as “Weylerism.”50
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Weyler's policies led to a diplomatic intervention by the United States. Spain
recalled Weyler, and President McKinley offered to oversee peace negotiations between
the Cuban revolutionaries and the Spanish. In the meantime, President McKinley
dispatched the USS Maine to Havana to protect American interests in the city. On
February 15, 1898, the Maine exploded and sunk. The explosion killed 266 of the 350
men onboard. The sinking pushed existing tensions to the brink and stirred war
sentiment in the United States.51
The cause of the explosion that sank the Maine was not immediately clear, and
President McKinley ordered an investigation that became known as the Sampson Board.
On March 21, 1898, the board concluded that the cause of the explosion had been a mine
that had detonated the ship’s magazines. The board’s investigation ignored a report from
January of that year that had warned of the risk of a fire in the coal bunker detonating a
ship’s magazine. Studies since the explosion have placed serious doubt on the Sampson
Board’s findings, most notably, a study by Admiral Hyman Rickover in 1974.
Regardless of its accuracy and lack of a named culprit the Sampson Board’s finding of
the external explosion was enough to push the U.S. Congress into demanding a Spanish
withdrawal from Cuba, and allowing the use of force if they did not.52
When America declared war in the spring of 1898 the country possessed only
limited military capabilities. At the end of the Civil War, the United States Army and
Navy stood among the largest in the world. The ranks of both services swelled because
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of the emergency of the Civil War. Once it was over, both demobilized down to prewar
levels even more quickly than they had grown. The Army reduced its strength to barely
enough manpower to patrol the frontier and enforce reconstruction. The Navy reverted to
sail power to carry out its largely diplomatic functions. This drastic reduction frustrated
those within the military, but it fit the needs of the country.
American strategy reverted, along with its manpower levels, to pre-Civil War
doctrine of relying on coastal fortifications and the expanse of the Atlantic and Pacific
Oceans to protect the country. For much of the remainder of the nineteenth-century
American military thinking looked to the problem of defending its shores. Even as late as
1898 Army writings focused on hypothetical invasions that would require a major land
force to defeat them, instead of the wars that they were about fight.53
The United States had few enemies, and only Britain or France had the
capability of sending an invasion force to America. With limited budgets that reflected
the lack of external threats, the military languished. In the 1880s things began to reverse
course, albeit slowly. The Navy began receiving appropriations from Congress to build
new steel warships and start the process of catching up on twenty years’ worth of naval
innovation. The resulting ships and modern guns they mounted would be the vessels that
carried out the destruction of the Spanish fleet in 1898.54
The Army especially found itself unprepared for an overseas conflict. At the
height of the Civil War, over a million men were enlisted in the U.S. Army. By 1875 that
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number had dropped to 25,000. Life in the army was short on pay and chances for
promotion, and the men that enlisted often had few other options. As many as one in
seven deserted each year. Pay for a private in the 1870s had dropped from thirteen
dollars a month to ten. Recruits received poor training and uniforms and often lived in
marginal conditions.55 Officers of the era spent decades at the same rank. Arthur
MacArthur, later to command U.S. forces in the Philippines, achieved the rank of
Lieutenant Colonel during the Civil War. Afterward, he spent 23 years as a captain.56
This small frontier garrison force was the army that James Franklin Bell had
joined in the 1870s. Bell spent his first twelve years in the Army as a 2nd Lieutenant and
was not promoted to Captain until the Spanish-American War. Despite his long service,
Bell still managed to be the junior of many Army officers. Shortly before the SpanishAmerican War began, the Army reported that 271 of its captains and lieutenants had
fought in the Civil War. When war broke out with Spain over 100,000 Civil War
veterans volunteered to fight. This volunteerism included ex-Confederate Generals
Joseph Wheeler and Fitzhugh Lee who were each appointed to commands in the newly
raised volunteers. A reporter favorably described the men of the army as “Generally
stalwart, sunburnt, resolute-looking men, twenty-five to thirty-five years of age, who
seemed to be in perfect physical condition, and who looked as if they had already seen
hard service and were ready and anxious for more.”57 The description proved accurate, at
least in part, since only 40 soldiers in the regular army in the spring of 1898 were under
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the age of 21, and a third of all enlisted men had been in the Army for more than five
years.58
The war in the Philippines shared much with the Plains Wars that the Army had
been fighting until that point. Both saw the Army deployed to remote garrisons that were
manned by a small unit. In the Philippines, these posts were often manned by a company
or less. In both, the Army faced opponents that could be difficult to bring to battle and
could melt away into difficult or vast terrain. The Army would turn to forced relocation
and indirect attacks on the enemy’s means to wage war to overcome these problems in
each conflict. A way of war that Secretary of War John Floyd explained as, “beating
their forces, capturing many prisoners…destroying large amount of property, and laying
waste to their country.”59 Floyd made his statement in 1858 to describe the way the Army
had been fighting Native Americans on the frontier. A way of war which had frustrated
many officers who focused on wars against western nations instead of the colonial style
of warfare that had occupied the Army until that point.60
The Plains Wars and the Philippine-American War also shared social
characteristics. American soldiers faced isolation, frustration, and poor pay. Their
opponents were non-whites and soldiers often harbored racial prejudices towards their
enemies. The similarities of frontier duty in the American West and the PhilippineAmerican War, combined with the shift towards a reformed industrialized army in the
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early 1900s, meant that the Philippine-American War would be the last major conflict of
the frontier Army.61
Despite the problems the Army faced, however, it brought strengths to the conflict
that it had not anticipated and was not prepared to fight. By the time the PhilippineAmerican War broke out, the long-serving veterans of the Army had begun to see some
efforts at modernization, even if it was happening slowly. During the 1870s and 80s, the
Army had adopted new modern breech-loading artillery, including easily transportable
mountain guns. Small arms and infantry tactics underwent changes as well. In the early
1890s, the army switched from single-shot black powder rifles to magazine fed
smokeless powder rifles. However, many of the volunteer units still carried the older
weapons well into the war. Regulars and volunteers benefited from a new tactical
manual issued in 1891 that emphasized open order, supporting fire, and advancing while
using cover and short rushes. While many of these changes were brought about in
response to similar changes in European armies, they faced their first trial in the
Philippines.62
FROM SPANISH-AMERICAN TO PHILIPPINE-AMERICAN WAR
The official declaration of war against Spain came on April 25th 1898 following
an investigation into the cause of the USS Maine explosion. The Philippines were not the
immediate concern of most Americans, save for a few members of the Naval Department,
including Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Theodore Roosevelt. Roosevelt ordered the
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American squadron under Dewey to the Philippines. Based on prewar plans to attack the
Spanish Pacific Fleet, Roosevelt ordered Dewey to prepare to attack the Spanish at
Manila. Roosevelt's orders to Dewey, among others, caused the Secretary of the Navy,
John Long, to worry that Roosevelt had done more to bring about war than the sinking of
the Maine, but Long did not countermand them. The eventual outcome of the battle of
Manila Bay would be entirely one-sided, but while the American squadron readied itself
in Hong Kong, observers there speculated on its defeat at the hand of well-prepared
Spanish defenses, including mines and shore batteries, concerns eventually proven to be
unfounded.63
While Dewey readied his squadron for war, Aguinaldo began his preparations to
resume leadership of the insurgency against Spain. Dewey's victory created a problem
for McKinley who was unsure what to do in the Philippines. In the meantime Filipinos
had already begun to fight against the Spanish once again, assuming that they would
receive American support for their cause. Under local commanders, Filipino forces
gained control of much of the Philippines and besieged Manila. Although initially
effective, this regional loyalty would later cause problems for the Filipino Army of
Liberation.64
Meanwhile, Aguinaldo was in communication with the American consulate in
Singapore. The meetings there became a source of controversy almost immediately.
Aguinaldo claimed that he had been promised American support for Filipino
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independence and self-rule. American officials denied having ever promised that to
Aguinaldo, but Dewey did give him military supplies, including rifles and orders for U.S.
agents to purchase more in Hong Kong. Aguinaldo used money which had been on hand
since Spain's payment years earlier to order 2,000 modern Mauser rifles, along with
200,000 rounds of ammunitions for just over $20,000. He provided nearly $70,000 more
to buy up additional munitions and supplies for the Revolutionary Army.65 The U.S. may
have come to regret facilitating these arms purchases as capturing arms later became a
primary objective for U.S. commanders fighting the Filipinos. With these weapons and
aid from the U.S., Aguinaldo began organizing a Filipino government and army to wage
war against the Spanish.66
Officially Dewey's objective had been to prevent the Spanish fleet from attacking
the American West Coast, but realistically the lopsided victory at Manila Bay had
achieved much more. The Philippines were on the table now as a possible territorial
gain, instead of just Cuba. Initially, McKinley did not create an official stance about
taking the Philippines from Spain, but he did order the War Department to send troops.
As effective as the American Navy was against the Spanish, it was not equipped to seize
any territory. The first 2,500 troops departed on May 25th. On the way, these forces
sailed to Guam, and on their arrival, the Spanish commander met them in a small boat to
apologize that he had no cannon to offer a salute, unaware of the war since word of
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hostilities had not reached the island. More troops left for the Philippines in June, 3500
on the 15th and 4800 on the 27th.67
The American soldiers arrived in Manila to find an unusual three party siege of
the city. The Spanish held Manila with a garrison of approximately 15,000 men.
Aguinaldo had surrounded the city on land with a roughly equivalent number of his own
troops. The Filipino army was weakened by Aguinaldo's decision to send additional
forces to aid in the war in the provinces and was unable to breach the Spanish defenses.
Dewey maintained a naval blockade of the city, and the American army landed at Cavite,
near Manila, but did not take a place in the trenches alongside the Filipino Army of
Liberation. Officers within the American 8th Corps had to negotiate to take over a
portion of the Filipino lines next to the shoreline on the south side of Manila, next to the
bay and the American naval guns floating offshore. While the American command,
including 8th Corps intelligence officer James Franklin Bell, unsuccessfully searched for
a weak point in the Spanish lines to their front, the American soldiers lived in wet
trenches under fire from Spanish sharpshooters.68
Unfortunately for the Americans, there seemed to be no way to take the Spanish
defenses other than a frontal assault. Behind their lines, the Spanish colonial authorities
had their own worries, most important their fear of what would happen if the Filipinos
took the city and the 70,000 residents still living there. The Spanish colonial government
did not want to surrender to the Filipino forces, and the Spanish government did not want
its commander to surrender at all. When the governor general suggested capitulation, he
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was sacked and replaced, but the new governor general agreed with his predecessor.
With help from the Belgian Consulate, he secretly negotiated an agreement with the
Americans that as long as the American Navy did not shell the city, then the Spanish
batteries would not open fire. Dewey believed that the Spanish only planned to offer
token resistance, Merritt did not agree. He felt that it only applied to the naval
engagement, and kept the information from his officers.69
On August 13th, 1898, the Americans launched an attack during a rainstorm.
Dewey's ships provided a bombardment of Spanish strongpoints while 8th Corps infantry
advanced on the Spanish positions. Whatever the understanding was between the two
sides before the attack, Dewey's understanding was the one that played out. Spanish
defenders quickly retreated into the city and raised a white flag. American soldiers
moved into the walled city to disarm the garrison and keep the Filipinos from entering.70
The American success of capturing Manila again highlighted the uncertainty in
American policy about what to do with the Philippines. Following American victories in
Cuba and the Philippines, Spain was eager to end the war before its losses started
affecting domestic politics. American concerns at home were centered on what to do
with the islands during a congressional election year, fresh off military victories, and
while war and expansionist sentiment were still high. From the American perspective,
Spain could not be allowed to keep the Philippines; there had been too much publicity of
Spain's cruelty towards its colonial possessions.
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Letting the Filipinos gain control of the islands was never really an option either.
The ideology of the day did not see them as fit for self-rule, and the U.S. desired a base in
the Pacific that could give them influence and strategic access to Asia, especially China.
The McKinley Administration assumed that to give control over to the Filipinos would
result in another European power taking control of the islands. A squadron of German
warships as strong as Dewey's had been shadowing the American Pacific Squadron and
had even sailed into Manila Bay and landed onshore. At one point an American warship
fired a warning shot at one of the German ships, and Dewy fumed at a German diplomat
in a widely-reported encounter that only fueled speculation of European expansion.71
European interest in China and other Asian countries made it seem like a plausible
outcome. America had seized part of the Philippines and could not give it up, and to take
part meant it had to occupy the rest. McKinley perceived that other outcomes would not
be acceptable to American voters faced with an upcoming election, or within his
administration, that was worried about rival powers in the Pacific.72
The U.S. went to the negotiating table with Spain and demanded all of the
Philippines. Spain held a weak position, both strategically and politically at home. Faced
with American demands, Spain did not receive help from other European powers to try
and curb America's gains. To other European powers, it was better to let the Americans
get the remnants of Spain's colonies than to see it go to another rival. Without anything
to bargain with or allies to help temper American demands, Spain gave the Americans
what they wanted. America received Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam, and, in exchange for $20
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million, the whole of the Philippines. The two countries signed the Treaty of Paris on
December 10th, 1898, just under eight months from the outbreak of the war and less than
a year since the sinking of the Maine. 73
Between the capture of Manila in August and the treaty in December, American,
and Filipino forces had tenuously remained in place. Aguinaldo's forces were still
receiving regular supplies of weapons from Hong Kong.74 The Americans held the city
and denied entry to the Army of Liberation which remained entrenched around the
Manila. James Franklin Bell, who had been assigned to Merritt's command as a Major of
Volunteers, helped ease this situation somewhat by functioning as a negotiator. The truce
held, but a new American commander made matters worse. General Elwell Otis replaced
Merritt when Merritt was sent to France to help negotiate an end to the Spanish-American
War. Otis had been in the Army for more than thirty years when the Spanish-American
War began. He had fought on Little Round Top during the Battle of Gettysburg with the
140th New York and continued fighting for the Union until he was wounded in the head
during the Siege of Petersburg. During his tenure in the Philippines, he became deeply
unpopular with the American volunteers. "Granny" Otis, as soldiers called him, was
criticized by his contemporaries for his temperament, inability to delegate, and
overreaching attention to detail. He allegedly once went to verify the value on a dead
mule.75
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Otis' faults exacerbated a tense situation that neither Otis nor Merritt were wellequipped to handle. Conditions in Manila were unpleasant and unsanitary, Filipino
soldiers could enter the city unarmed, but would later face off against American soldiers
along the lines outside the walled city, and neither commander was able to get clear
instructions from the McKinley Administration.76
Otis quickly issued a letter to Aguinaldo that demanded the withdrawal of the
Army of Liberation. Unsurprisingly, Aguinaldo kept his army in place. The tension
between leaders was matched by tension between soldiers. Patrols and sentries faced
each other day after day, and disputes, including gunfire, had to be settled before they
turned into an all-out battle.
News of the peace treaty reached the Philippines in January 1899 and only made
tensions worse. From the Filipino standpoint, the treaty represented a second betrayal
following American seizure of Manila. Aguinaldo issued a proclamation that denounced
the treaty and warned of bloodshed. He also began to plan for war and started organizing
forces within the city to take part in an uprising once the fighting began. If the Filipinos
could coordinate their efforts, then American forces stretched thinly along the perimeter
of Manila would have to deal with hostile forces from two directions. The treaty
removed any remaining pretense of a peaceful solution to the ongoing standoff and drove
home the possibility that any spark could be the one to bring about war. 77
The personal and military tensions were exacerbated by a clash of cultures.
American attitudes towards Filipinos, both combatants and non-combatants, were
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thoroughly racist. The language that American soldiers used to describe Filipinos was
often filled with the same racial slurs and epithets that were in use towards Native and
African-Americans. Even the soldiers and officers that saw some noble purpose in
America's incursion into the Philippines often spoke of Filipinos as an inferior race. To
them, it was because of the Filipino's inability to rule themselves that the Americans were
there in the first place. McKinley, Taft, Bell, and other figures all espoused this idea at
one point. Even reporters that discussed the harsh counter-insurgency campaign that Bell
led listed the excesses of violence enacted by American soldiers, but went on to declare
that the Filipinos were savages that only responded to violence.78
At the time, there were voices of dissension, both in the Army and back in the
United States, Mark Twain being one of the most famous.79 One of the apocryphal
stories about the Philippine-American War that highlights the complicated and
derogatory nature of the war comes from the arrival of the African-American 25th
Infantry Regiment. When asked by a white soldier what they were doing there, a trooper
from the 25th Infantry Regiment is reported to have replied that they were there to "Take
up the white man's burden" referencing Rudyard Kipling’s poem about the PhilippineAmerican War.80 But despite some limited dissent, American troops largely thought of
the Filipinos as "other." Whether the view was based in a paternal racism that thought of
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Filipinos as a society that needed American governance or outright racism that saw
Filipinos as savages, American troops viewed and treated their enemy as an inferior race.
On February 4th 1899, tensions that had been building for months spilled over.
Sometime around 8:30 that evening, three soldiers from 1st Nebraska Volunteer Infantry
Regiment were on patrol at a vulnerable point in the American line, close to one of the
former Spanish blockhouses. The American defense was stretched thin around Manila,
most regiments covered their assigned areas with outposts and picket lines, with regular
patrols to cover the gaps. At this particular point in the line, tensions were already high,
as the Nebraskan volunteers held a particularly exposed position that just days before had
been the subject of a dispute about the neutral zone between the two armies. What led to
the firing is still debated, some sources claiming that the Filipinos were peacefully
guarding their outpost, while others maintain that they approached the American patrol
and refused to halt. Many Filipino sources assert that Cpl. Anastascio Felix, along with
two other soldiers were standing in the doorway to Blockhouse Number 7, one of the
former Spanish positions, when Americans shot them.81
Regardless of the cause, what is generally agreed on is that Pvt. William Grayson
fired the first shot that killed one of the Filipinos, followed in quick succession by two
more shots from Grayson's companions. Grayson offered his own account of what
happened that evening.
"I challenged with another "Halt." Then he immediately shouted "Halto"
to me. Well I thought the best thing to do was to shoot him. He dropped.
Then two Filipinos sprang out of the gateway about fifteen feet from us. I
called "Halt" and Miller fired and dropped one. I saw that another was left.
81
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Well I think I got my second Filipino that time. We retreated to where six
other fellows were and I said "Line up fellows; the niggers are here all
through these yards."82

As Grayson and his fellow Nebraskans ran back to their lines, firing spread to the
rest of their unit, and soon spread to neighboring units and beyond until the entire
perimeter was engaged in a sporadic firefight through most of the night. Several
American units reported heavy firing along with probing attacks on their positions.
Sentries had fired on each other before, and there was little love among American
soldiers for their Filipino counterparts. By this point, both the Americans and Filipinos
expected and were planning for a war when the firing started. This time around there was
no one in a position to stop it.83
By the next morning, the firefight evolved into a general engagement all around
the city. The American Provost Guard in Manila proper quickly cracked down on
suspected insurgents, and although a few managed to snipe or start fires, the feared twopronged attack never emerged, partly thanks to quick action on the part of the Americans,
but mainly because the battle had taken the Filipinos by surprise as well. Those who had
been preparing an attack from within the city were not ready to act when the fighting
began.84
Along the perimeter, the 8th Corps was divided into two divisions, the 1st under
General Thomas Anderson defending the south side of the city, and the 2nd under
General Arthur MacArthur defending the northern side. Both commanders had
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developed contingency plans in case of an outbreak of hostilities, and began to put their
plans in motion with support from warships in the harbor and the Navy's gunboats in the
Pasig River. All along the line, American regiments launched attacks that drove back the
Filipinos and captured their defenses. Eager volunteers alongside the stalwart regulars
made use of reformed tactics they had learned in the months since they had enlisted.
They advanced in short rushes, using their own volleys of rifle fire and supporting
artillery to cover their advance. While there was some confusion and strong resistance at
points, by the end of the day the Americans had soundly defeated the Army of
Liberation.85
The Battle of Manila became the largest battle of the Philippine-American War,
between 11,000 American soldiers, and maybe as many as 20,000 Filipinos. American
casualties amounted to 44 killed and 194 wounded. Filipino losses are harder to
determine; some estimates placed the number in the thousands.86 One source places
Filipino dead, not including wounded, at 3,000.87 The official American report claimed
the Filipinos had suffered 700 killed and 3,300 wounded.88 Otis speculated that there had
been about 500 Filipinos killed and another 500 captured, and while his own casualties
were light in comparison, they were enough to give him pause, considering how thinly
stretched his lines were.89
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PROBLEMS WITHIN THE ARMY OF LIBERATION
The Philippine-American War began on the evening of February 4th, 1899. For
much of 1899, the war was waged between two standing armies. By year’s end,
however, Aguinaldo shifted into a guerrilla war after failing to hold the Americans in
Manila. During the conventional phase of the war, Filipino forces struggled to defend
even strong positions. They could hold the Americans and inflict losses, but American
soldiers often easily breached positions that should have been formidable. Before the
Battle of Manila, Filipinos had worked for months preparing their positions, and all the
wisdom of the day spoke to the difficulty in taking prepared positions, even those
defended in small numbers. As the campaign went on American soldiers and officers
showed aggression, and even assaults against larger forces often succeeded, typically
with light casualties.90
In fact, Americans soldiers had even recently experienced the potential cost of
attacking an entrenched enemy. At the battle of San Juan Hill the previous summer,
Americans had attacked Spanish forces who were dug in and equipped with modern
rifles. Although the battle was a victory for the Americans they suffered heavy casualties,
210 killed and 1,180 wounded. The Spanish suffered significantly fewer casualties, 215
killed, and only 376 wounded. In that battle, they had been attacking a smaller Spanish
force, less than 2,000 strong.91
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At a glance, the differences in the experience of the soldiers does not seem to be
the answer. The American troops at this early stage of the campaign mostly consisted of
state volunteers with mixed levels of training. Filipino forces consisted of men with
experience fighting the Spanish, ex-members of Spanish colonial militias, and new
recruits that by the time of open hostilities had been in the military as long as many of the
American volunteers.
If experience was not the answer, then neither were the arms the two sides carried.
Later in the war, and especially during the irregular phase of the war, American troops
consistently used modern bolt action rifles while the Filipinos struggled even to keep
their troops armed with any rifle. However, at this point, both sides carried a similar mix
of small arms. Most of the volunteer units still carried single shot black powder arms.
Thanks to the modernization efforts of the early 1890s, the Army had adopted a new
magazine fed, bolt action rifle that used smokeless powder ammunition. The new KragJorgensen rifle incorporated features at the forefront of small arms technology of that era.
However, government arsenals had not built enough of the new rifles yet to equip
everyone. Regular units carried the new rifles while volunteers carried the older guns,
only occasionally getting updated replacements.92
The weapons of the Filipino forces were as mixed as what the Americans carried.
Although significant parts of the Filipino forces only had Bolo knives, many carried
rifles. Until the beginning of the Philippine-American War in February 1899, the
Filipinos had been able to bring in arms from outside and use what they had captured
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from the Spanish. When Dewey first arrived he had helped Aguinaldo purchase arms.
The American Army only began their campaign to deny rifles to Filipino forces later.
Filipino forces carried Mauser rifles, the most modern design in the world at the time,
and American-made Remington Rolling Block rifles, another single-shot breechloader
equivalent to the single-shot Springfield rifle that American volunteers used. These were
the same kind of arms that the Spanish troops at San Juan used to inflict heavy losses on
the American assault.
The largest differences in weapons between the two armies were artillery and
ammunition supply. The Americans had modern artillery and, in some areas, supportive
naval gunfire. Filipino forces had a few field guns, but that was all. The Filipino
ammunition supply consisted of imported, captured, or locally produced ammunition.
Often it was poor quality since it was hard to source the right components. Still, the
Army of Liberation possessed modern weapons but failed to inflict heavy casualties.93
David Silbey argues that the overall poor performance of Filipinos was in the way
they recruited and organized their troops. Deficiencies in training and equipment only
provide part of the answer. Silbey points out that the Filipino forces were recruited at a
local level often at a patron/client type relationship. Aguinaldo only had loose control
over many of his commanders and could not enforce Army-wide standards of discipline.
During combat, this problem manifested itself as units fighting long enough to fill
an obligation and then withdrawing, in some cases even before American troops had
closed within effective range. Add to this the other problems with the Filipino combat
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abilities and American forces achieved victories that simply would not have been
possible against other forces. Many Filipinos simply viewed war differently than their
American counterparts. They filled their obligations by going out and firing at
Americans until they felt threatened and then retreated, having done the extent of their
duty. Limited firing at troops in the distance, combined with poor ammunition and
training meant that Americans suffered much lighter casualties than an observer might
have expected. Once troops fell back, they left gaps in the lines which American troops
could exploit. 94
Silbey's argument does provide an explanation beyond poor weapons or American
individual soldier superiority. Withdrawing during combat is a risky undertaking for any
force, but especially an undertrained one. In the face of a determined enemy it can be
disastrous, as many of the Filipino defeats were. Brian Linn war argues along similar
lines. He points out that while the weapons, training, and marksmanship all contributed
to American success, the key factor was overall cohesion. While individual Filipino units
fought well, they often did not rely on the units alongside them. This kind of breakdown
could turn almost any break in the line into a chance for Americans to turn the battle.
The Battle of Manila demonstrated the otherwise unproven capabilities of the American
volunteers, while severely damaging Filipino morale. It also influenced the Americans to
be highly aggressive throughout the war, even to the point of recklessness.95
During the conventional phase of the war, only a handful of actions resulted in
anything close to significant American casualties. Most American attacks were one-sided

94
95

Ibid., 72–76.
Linn, The Philippine War, 1899-1902, 2000, 62–63.

39

successes. American commanders learned to press the attack and their aggression paid
off. They consistently drove the Army of Liberation back. Constant retreat never
allowed the Filipinos a chance to institute any reform or spend the time that they needed
to rest and improve.
For their credit, Filipino troops could stand and fight; the problem was which
units could be counted on to fight and which could not. U.S. General Henry Lawton
called the Filipino soldiers "The bravest men I have ever seen."96 Courage alone could
not make up for the widespread deficiencies in the Army of Liberation. At least some
Filipino officers recognized the problems, but trying to reform an army on limited
resources in the face of an aggressive enemy was always going to be almost impossible,
and Aguinaldo, though a shrewd politician, performed poorly as a military commander.97
During February 1899 Otis sought to maintain his position around Manila.
Although American troops had been successful in the initial battles, their lines were thin,
and Otis felt that he needed more manpower to go on the offensive without risking
Manila. The Filipinos gave him good reason to worry as well. The previously discussed
problems with the Army of Liberation were not entirely evident to the Americans yet,
and it managed to keep the pressure on the American defenses. On February 22, 1899,
they launched an attack on the city's northern suburbs after infiltrating American lines
with approximately 1,000 men. The Americans repulsed the attack and inflicted heavy
casualties on the Filipinos, but it was enough to remind the Americans that their lines
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were vulnerable. To counter this threat, the Americans patrolled aggressively to break up
any insurgent build up near the lines.
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AGUINALDO’S DEFEAT
Otis soon began a two-pronged offensive from his base in Manila. MacArthur
was to drive north toward the Filipino capital in Malolos with his division while General
Anderson drove south with his division. The colorful Brigadier General Lloyd Wheaton
led Anderson's spearhead. Wheaton was another Civil War veteran. He had enlisted
during the war and eventually won the Medal of Honor and a promotion to brevet
Colonel. Following the war, he reverted to the rank of Captain which he held for 25
years. He sought to move down the Pasig River and seize the fertile farmland around the
lake Laguna de Bay. Wheaton's campaign began on March 12, 1899. His troops advanced
along the Pasig River with help from the gunboat Laguna de Bay named after the lake
that was their objective. Wheaton's troops encountered stubborn Filipino resistance,
holding the Americans for several hours at a time. The Filipinos fought until they were
threatened with being cut off or until the gunboat arrived with its heavy firepower.
Despite this resistance, they were unable to stop Wheaton's column. The Americans
achieved the objective, and along the way, Wheaton implemented a policy reminiscent of
his former superior, General Sherman. Wheaton ordered the destruction of towns and
villages along his line of advance, later claiming it was in response to enemy resistance.
American soldiers burned buildings out to five miles on either side of the road as they
marched, and as one soldier stated, "The entire district so destroyed so that it would seem
necessary not only for a bird but even a Filipino to carry his rations while crossing it."99
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MacArthur, who had expected heavy resistance, entered Malolos on March 31,
1899, and found only sporadic resistance in the city. MacArthur's command had suffered
56 killed and 478 wounded since early March. While these are not insignificant numbers,
they were not enough to slow down or stop the American advance. Taking Malolos
proved indecisive as Aguinaldo and the government retreated further. Observers began to
note the difficulties in fighting the Filipinos, as a correspondent wrote about the
objective, "[The Filipinos]...took up the goalposts and carried them back."100
The Army of Liberation retreated, along with the government, to Calumpit, a few
miles to the north. MacArthur wanted to continue the advance, but Otis ordered him to
stop and refit his troops before continuing. The American advance resumed on April 24,
1899. To defend the city General Luna dug in his troops behind a river, but even a strong
natural defense and entrenchments did not stop the American assault. By April 25, 1899
the Americans captured Calumpit. American aggression, even against superior numbers
and prepared positions, proved enough to rout Filipino defenders. As one soldier wrote
home in early May "The new method of fighting this war is to fire a few rounds - then
advance towards the enemy - firing as we go. using this tactic, the Filipinos cannot shoot
at us without exposing themselves - which they seldom do - and they soon leave in a
hurry."101
While troops fought in the Philippines, politicians had yet to ratify the Treaty of
Paris, which had granted control of the Philippines to the U.S. Ratification was not a
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forgone conclusion, but it was an uphill fight for the anti-imperialist faction that stood
against it. The anti-imperialists argued against annexing the Philippines citing more
pressing domestic issues, economic problems, and the immorality of forcing American
institutions at gunpoint onto another people. Imperialists possessed a majority in the
Senate but needed a two-thirds majority to ratify the treaty. Initially, it seemed that they
might be short of votes. Their arguments played to patriotism and, rather cynically, to the
United States' treatment of Native Americans. A vote against ratification was to say that
America was incapable of overseeing the Philippines. To counter those who said that the
Filipinos should be granted their self-government imperialists claimed that this same
freedom had not been given to the Native American tribes at home, so why should they
grant it to Filipinos? In the end, events dictated the outcome of the debate when the
fighting started. On February 6, 1899, the Senate voted 57-27 to approve the treaty.102
Ratification and the Army's success in the Philippines began to reshape the
public's image of the military as well. The Dodge Commission released its report on the
Army's shortcomings in Cuba in February of 1899. To the American public, the old
Army had been made up of poor enlisted men and stifled officers. To observers, the new
Army that fought in the Philippines consisted of energetic volunteers that brought
civilization to a new western frontier. Along with the Army's successes, McKinley
requested and approved bills from Congress that expanded the size of the regular army
and added more volunteer units.103
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The capture of Calumpit represented the end of the Manila campaign. The
campaign had been a complete success for the Americans. For the Filipinos, it had been a
disaster. The Army of Liberation was unable to stop the Americans or significantly delay
their advance. These conditions put its leaders in a difficult position. The summer
monsoon season brought a temporary halt to major campaigning. American units, well
past their enlistment deadlines, began to go home and be replaced with fresh volunteers
from the states.
Aguinaldo faced a supremely difficult task. He recognized the need to reorganize
and rebuild his army, but he had limited resources and time. He complicated his
difficulties by trying to consolidate his power and had General Luna executed.
Aguinaldo's army was fractured, under-equipped, and had poor military leaders.
Aguinaldo had two options. He could try and keep the army together and in the field
against the Americans, or he could order his troops to break up into smaller commands
and wage guerrilla warfare. He chose to keep his army together. The Filipinos had been
successful against the Spanish as guerrilla fighters, and committing to that kind of
warfare earlier might have yielded better results. By keeping his army together to fight a
conventional war, Aguinaldo made both a political and military decision. The Army of
Liberation remained as the only real institution of government. Keeping it in the field
meant the government still existed. The army gave disparate groups a rallying point and
legitimacy as a state, at least in Aguinaldo's eyes. If he broke up the army, then he risked
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further fracturing and losing his claim, both to outsiders and his fellow Filipinos, that the
Philippines were a sovereign state.104
On the American side, General Otis looked to the fall as his chance to destroy the
Army of Liberation and end the war. The Army had no trouble in finding more
volunteers after the successes in Cuba and the Philippines and though the Army still
faced some logistics issues fresh regiments, including three African American units,
replaced those regiments that had gone home. Otis had around 20,000 American troops at
his disposal and had begun to recruit Filipino auxiliary units led by American officers to
free up more troops for frontline duty. During the spring and summer, the Navy
instituted a blockade that greatly hindered communication and support between islands,
and Aguinaldo's forces were limited to the resources they had within the islands.
When Otis launched his campaign on October 9, 1899 he split his forces into
three columns in the face of the Army of Liberation. The three-pronged attack was
designed to pin Aguinaldo's forces in place while columns under Wheaton and Lawton
maneuvered behind the Army of Liberation. Once in place, the third column under
MacArthur could drive the Filipinos into these blocking forces.
The American plan ran into trouble as heavy rains slowed MacArthur's advance
and much of the Army of Liberation escaped. Forces under the command of General
Samuel Young captured a proclamation that stated that Aguinaldo intended to move his
capital once again, this time into the mountains roughly 75 miles from the American front
lines. Young was yet another Civil War veteran. He had enlisted as a private and risen to
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the rank of Brigadier General. Young had fought across the bridge over Antietam Creek
at the Battle of Antietam and participated in the Plains Wars. He proposed to pursue and
capture Aguinaldo ahead of the main American force while living off the land for his
supplies.105
On November 7th, General Young took a mixed unit of 1,000 men and pushed
ahead in his attempt to capture Aguinaldo. Away from their supplies, Young's small
force kept up a close pursuit of Aguinaldo. In the first seven days, they marched 120
miles, but Aguinaldo managed to stay ahead of them. At the village of Pozorrubio on the
15th, gunfire warned Aguinaldo that Young's men had almost caught up with him, and he
and his bodyguard left town as the American's fought their way into it. By this point,
Young needed reinforcements to continue, which met up with his force in the form of a
battalion of Texas volunteers. Aguinaldo had fled into the mountains of Central Luzon
and left a 60-man rearguard to defend the pass into the mountains behind him. On
December 2nd, the Americans reached the chokepoint, and the ensuing day-long Battle of
Tirad Pass became christened the Filipino Thermopylae. Sixty Filipinos held the pass
dug in behind rocks, and their strong position only broke when a small detachment of
Americans scaled a cliff to fire on the Filipinos from above. Only eight of the sixty
Filipinos survived, but the delay proved to be enough. Within a week, the Americans
ended their pursuit. Many in Young's column had marched on without shoes, on reduced
rations, and sick. They had reached their limit.106
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Aguinaldo managed to escape into relative safety. Although the Americans failed
to capture Aguinaldo, they had separated him from his army. During his flight, on
December 13th, 1899 Aguinaldo had ordered his army to turn to guerrilla warfare. He
had been able to avoid this difficult order since the outbreak of the war. At one point the
Army of Liberation stood on the verge of capturing Manilla and possibly completing a
campaign to gain independence from Spain. Now a conventional war turned into an
irregular one. The Army of Liberation melted into the countryside to wage a different
kind of war on the Americans.
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CHAPTER 2: IRREGULAR WAR
By late December 1899, General Otis' fall offensives had drawn to a close and he
turned to occupying the rest of the archipelago. The Army of Liberation seemed
thoroughly beaten, and Otis bragged that he could march a 3,000-man column anywhere
in the islands and that the insurgents would be powerless to stop him. This sense of
impunity, and assurances from Filipino elites in Manila that they wanted annexation, led
many Americans to believe the war was over. Even Bell reported that the only remaining
resistance was "small bands...largely composed of the flotsam and jetsam of the wreck of
the insurrection."107
AMERICAN FRUSTRATION
What remained out of sight for many Americans was the fact that many Filipinos
had heeded Aguinaldo's December call to begin a guerrilla war. The remnants of the
Army of Liberation used their experience waging war against the Spanish and
transformed into an effective guerrilla army. Even as Americans like Bell were assuming
that they only needed to mop up isolated armed resistance, the Filipinos were preparing
for a different kind of war.
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In early 1900, the U.S. military government began to shift into a new role as
administrator over the islands. The Americans began reorganizing the courts, legal
codes, and local and regional governments. In the areas that they controlled, Americans
also introduced campaigns to improve social conditions. Americans began widespread
public health and education campaigns, as they had done when they first occupied
Manila.108 In all of this, the goal was to show Filipinos the benefits of U.S. rule and
convince them of the sovereignty of the United States over the Philippines. Ultimately
American officials believed that the war had been won and that they could look to a
transition from a military government to a civilian one.109
For those Filipinos that remained in the field, the Americans introduced other
incentives. One of the key components of continued resistance to the American
occupation was weapons. It may seem like an obvious statement, but the Filipinos were
short on firearms from the outset. The Americans recognized this weakness and actively
tried to exploit it. In late 1899 they had introduced a bounty on any rifle that was handed
over. Between November 1899 and April 1900, the bounty netted over 1,000 firearms in
Luzon. James Bell during his command of the 36th United States Volunteer Infantry
Regiment, one of those units recruited from ex-state volunteers, considered it a success
that his unit had captured 775 rifles over the course of seven months.110 In just a few
months the bounty was more effective than Bell's regiment in the field had been for the
better part of a year. The financial incentive was enough to get many Filipinos to
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surrender. One insurgent officer wrote that his whole command would surrender for the
bounty if they knew that they would not be imprisoned.111
While the Americans busied themselves with occupation and administration,
Filipino commanders began to adapt to fighting a guerrilla war. Although the Army of
Liberation had been broken up, significant numbers of Filipinos remained ready to
continue the war against the Americans. An insurgent commander laid out the plan to
fight back against the Americans. He ordered his men to "Annoy the enemy at different
points...our aim is not to vanquish them, a difficult matter considering their superiority in
numbers and arms, but to inflict on them constant losses, to the end of discouraging them
and convincing them of our rights."112
Aguinaldo nominally ran the insurgency from his headquarters in Northern
Luzon. The islands were divided into districts with a commanding general and subdistricts led by colonels and majors. The fighting men of the insurgency comprised two
main groups, former soldiers from the Army of Liberation operating as insurgents fulltime and a part-time militia. This structure depended on the ability of local commanders.
Throughout the insurgency, however, Aguinaldo struggled to maintain control from his
remote hideout in the mountains of Northern Luzon. Actual responsibility for waging the
war fell to subordinates operating almost with near complete independence. Aguinaldo
still represented a significant figure, but could do little to influence his commanders. The
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local district commanders often commanded only a few hundred men in a given province
that were divided up into smaller bands.113
These bands of regulars consisted of the men that had been in the Army of
Liberation. They often operated in groups of fewer than 50 and were supposed to be the
best equipped. However, the Filipinos were still under-armed for the war. The U.S.
blockade of the islands prevented any outside shipments of weapons from reaching the
insurgents. They relied on a limited amount of homemade ammunition which prevented
adequate practice and frequently misfired. After one engagement, an American officer
concluded that 60 percent of the rounds fired at his men had misfired. The rounds that
did fire often missed due to the condition of the weapons and a lack of training. The
insurgent officer knew their limitations and tried to overcome them by using carefully
prepared ambushes to engage the Americans and preserving their strength by quickly
withdrawing after a few volleys. These tactics enabled them to maintain their manpower
and frustrate the American soldiers.114
The part-time militia that made up the rest of the Filipino army maintained the
network that kept the regulars in the field. They provided the regulars with supplies,
intelligence, and shelter. These bolomen, known for the knives they carried, acted as the
local police for the Filipino shadow government. They collected taxes, enforced the
rules, gathered intelligence, and protected local officials. To gain civilian support the
insurgents appealed to nationalism, ethnic and religious loyalties, and coercion. Civilians
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that aided the Americans or did not support the insurgency were subject to fines, beating,
property destruction, or even death.115
As the Filipinos laid the groundwork for their guerrilla strategy, the Americans
began to implement their policy of attraction. During the first half of 1900, the
Americans assumed that the Filipinos had peacefully accepted their defeat and were at
least tolerant of American rule. This assumption was out of touch and hampered by poor
intelligence. Regardless, the Americans began a campaign to provide vaccinations, jobs,
and schools. The program relied on low-level officers in charge of individual garrisons
to administer local government and aid to Filipino citizens. It was the fulfillment of
America’s plan for benevolent assimilation. Americans saw that it was their duty to aid a
society that was incapable of self-rule. In many regions, American efforts at this kind of
governance succeeded. A local garrison, stability, and improvements to the local society
garnered loyalty from civilian populations that had already suffered enough fighting, or
that had not been particularly loyal to the revolution in the first place. Success in these
more peaceful areas even contributed to hiding the growth of the insurgency in others, as
both Otis and his replacement, MacArthur, thought the insurgents to be on their last legs
during the winter of 1899-1900. MacArthur considered his offer of amnesty in June of
1900 to be a gesture to end the war and attract the final holdouts of the insurgency to
surrender.116
Even as these programs began, the fighting continued. Insurgents raided
communication lines, supply columns, and even led one American General to write that
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defeat might be at hand. In addition, the insurgents continued to intimidate civilians and
in just 1900 alone the Americans recorded over 300 assassinations and over 400 assaults.
By April 1900, Bell had changed his tone from comparing the insurgency to flotsam. He
reported that his command in Southern Luzon was unable to control more than a few
towns, and could not control the surrounding territory.117 Even with an apparent defeat of
Aguinaldo's standing army and the bulk of the U.S. Army garrisoning the Philippines, the
Americans could not provide enough security to end the war that they had assumed to be
won.118
Initially, during the rush to enlist at the outbreak of the Spanish-American War,
the U.S. Army struggled to cope with the rapid expansion. The army struggled to equip,
train and move, both its regular and volunteer units during initial war with Spain. By the
time that Aguinaldo disbanded the Filipino Revolutionary Army in December of 1899,
the U.S. Army had largely overcome these problems. New regulars and volunteers alike
received better training. Many of the units now had combat experience from the previous
year's fighting. When state volunteer regiments returned home, many men signed on
with new United States Volunteer regiments. Many of the initial volunteers that fought in
the Philippines had been from Western states.119 They had performed well and frequently
re-enlisted with new units. The volunteer regiments that formed had large numbers of
experienced soldiers in addition to new recruits.120
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The senior officers of the army possessed experience that dated back to the Civil
War. While their combat experience may have seemed dated, they had firsthand
knowledge of the March to the Sea or Sheridan's Valley Campaign, along with
campaigns to pacify the Native American tribes living in the American West. Out of
thirty American Generals that served in the Philippines, twenty-six participated in the
Indian Wars. Among the four that had not, Frederick Funston had volunteered with the
Cuban revolutionaries fighting against Spain.121 The lower ranking officers that had
spent years with little to no prospects for advancement had learned to be comfortable
commanding small unit actions and remote garrisons in the American West. This
experience from the Civil War to the Western Frontier had helped to develop a method of
waging counter-insurgency warfare within the army. Commanders used tactics that
would later see widespread use in the Philippines, including population control,
destruction of property and resources, and retaliation for continued resistance. While the
Army struggled to respond to the initial declaration of war, it was well equipped for the
coming guerrilla war.122
Although violence increased in the islands in the spring and summer of 1900, it is
important to remember that during this period the war remained highly localized. While
the Filipino Army was still together American efforts centered on its destruction, but
even as Aguinaldo spread his men through the provinces to fight back, many areas
remained peaceful. In thirty-four of the seventy-seven provinces in the Philippines no
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fighting took place. Despite almost half of the islands seeing no fighting, the upcoming
pacification campaign required a commitment of most of the army's resources.123
By October of 1900, there were 70,000 U.S. soldiers stationed in the Philippines.
This was at a time when the authorized strength of the regular army was still under
100,000 men. To combat the insurgency and establish a civil government they were
stationed in over 400 different garrisons. Even if they could concentrate in each one,
there would be fewer than 200 men per garrison to fight the insurgency and carry out
civil rule. The numbers were often much smaller than that. The garrisons required
constant resupply that relied on poor or no infrastructure and the re-supply columns made
ideal targets for insurgent ambushes.124
The troops not engaged in supply and civil administration tried to combat the
insurgency by launching patrols into the countryside. They made use of mounted
infantry and cavalry when they could, or carried a light load when they could not. Bell's
command marched with just 150 rounds of ammunition, rifle, canteen, cup, half a mess
kit, utensils, first aid kit, towel, and a poncho or shelter half. His infantry regiment,
which he claimed was never up to its authorized 1,000-man strength, made use of up to
150 horses for communication and chasing down insurgents, in addition to its pack train
for supply and any horses privately owned by officers and men.125
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These patrols often faced difficult terrain, but their greatest obstacle was poor
intelligence. During the initial year of the guerrilla war, the insurgent intelligence
network was still strong, and the U.S. often did not have the trust or control of the civilian
population to prevent them from warning insurgents. American officers aggressively
pressed any engagement because opportunities to fight the insurgents were limited and
they did not have a high regard for the insurgent's skill in a prolonged firefight.126
Aggressive American tactics did not always win the day. A company of the 15th
Infantry Regiment under the command of Captain David Mitchell launched an assault on
the town of Matibac in Southern Luzon in order to eliminate an insurgent stronghold
there, and capture insurgent General Juan Cailles. As many as 800 insurgents
outnumbered Mitchell's 130-man company, but he continued with the attack regardless.
American soldiers had to approach the town over a long causeway flanked by flooded
ground on either side. While Mitchell led part of his company up the causeway, another
part of the company moved into a flanking position and attacked from a second direction.
Flooded terrain delayed the flanking party, and the insurgents concentrated their fire on
Mitchell and the men he led down the causeway. Despite their poor equipment, the
insurgents found the Americans to be easy targets, and Mitchell's men found themselves
caught in a crossfire and retreated.
Mitchell's headlong attack led to 23 Americans killed and 19 more wounded.
Mitchell was among the dead, and while MacArthur praised the soldier's courage
publicly, he confided that if Mitchell had survived, he would have ordered him court-

126

Arnold, Jungle of Snakes, 2009, 28–29.

57

martialed. To deepen the injury, the American forces that returned the following day
found no Filipino fighters. The insurgents had melted into surrounding towns and
villages as civilians. Mitchell's attack was foolish, but it came from a widespread desire
to simply engage the enemy. The opportunity to bring insurgents to battle at Matibac
outweighed the tactical disadvantage that the Americans faced there. This style of
combat which frustrated the Americans earned the name "Amigo Warfare" among
officers and soldiers. Insurgents could be beaten or driven off, and then later blend in
with the civilian population, their arms hidden until the next opportunity to fight. Many
American soldiers failed to distinguish the civilian population from the insurgents, and
the insurgents used this advantage as much as they could.127
American troops in the Philippines often exacerbated their tense relationship with
the civilian population. They commonly drank which often led to fights. Soldiers would
take food or other supplies from villagers, and at the end of the spectrum, they would
retaliate violently against nearby civilian populations when a comrade was killed. Many
Filipino civilians were simply caught between the two sides. The people that lived life
between the soldiers and insurgents had to cope as best as they could. In most towns, it
led to the population supporting the Americans by day and the insurgents by night, they
had to try and appease both sides while risking the wrath of each.128
Drinking and fighting were not the only clashes between the two cultures. From
the beginning of the war, reports alleged American atrocities against Filipinos.
Describing the Battle of Manila, a soldier had written home that his Washington regiment
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had killed more than 1,000 Filipinos, including women and children, and that they had
burned down all their houses. He went on to allege that the Tennessee regiment nearby
refused to take any prisoners. Another sergeant wrote that whenever they found a
wounded insurgent that he and his men resorted to bayonets to kill them. Allegations
quickly arose from a private in Frederick Funston's Kansas regiment that officers had
ordered to kill prisoners and that the man had been ordered by his colonel to shoot four
prisoners. Later the allegations grew that Funston used his rank and position to prevent a
fair investigation.129
It is difficult to corroborate the soldier's claim of 1,000 killed, especially
considering that total number of Filipino dead for the entire Battle of Manila was likely
less than 1,000. How often American soldiers killed prisoners or noncombatants is
unclear. The allegations kept appearing, often in American newspapers as letters from
soldiers, but official charges or trials rarely followed. A later study claimed that there
were 57 incidents during the Philippine-American War which met a legal definition of
atrocity.130 In addition to defined atrocities, casualty reports often returned high numbers
of Filipino dead, often several times greater than the number of wounded, unusual for any
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conflict. The statistic suggests a willingness on soldiers' part to carry out "no prisoners"
orders.131
The problem may have been more extensive, as Bell and other officers claimed
that although they issued orders against these acts, they had little ability to stop them
outside of their immediate presence. An officer named Henry Allen wrote,
"You, as well as I, know that in bringing to a successful issue war
measures out here certain things will take place not intended by the higher
authorities; that the 'water cure' and other unauthorized methods will be
resorted to in spite of the strictest instructions. I have heard that under me,
although against my orders, the 'water cure' and other measures just as
bad, or worse, were adopted, and probably under you the same; moreover,
it can be said that such things have taken place under all commanders out
here."132
The torture method known as the "water cure" that Allen wrote about was widely
used by the Americans to interrogate prisoners. The actual method was described by an
American soldier as follows.
"A man is thrown down on his back and three or four men sit or
stand on his arms and legs and hold him down;...a carbine barrel or a stick
as big as a belaying pin, and, if possible, a wooden log or stone is put
under his head or neck, so he can be held more firmly. In the case of very
old men I have seen their teeth fall out, -- and I mean when it was done a
little roughly. He is simply held down and then water is poured onto his
face down his throat and nose from a jar, and that is kept up until the man
gives some sign or becomes unconscious. And then...he is simply...rolled
aside rudely, so that water is expelled. A man suffers tremendously, there
is no doubt about it."133
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Allegations of torture and atrocities stirred anti-imperialist voices in the United
States. 1900 was a U.S. presidential election year, and the Democrat candidate William
Jennings Bryan campaigned on anti-imperialism. Aguinaldo, keenly aware of this, knew
that it was his best time to impact American policy. He ordered his forces to increase
their attacks on American outposts to try and inflict losses that would hurt McKinley’s
chance of re-election. Aguinaldo's plan was likely his best opportunity to impact the U.S.
occupation significantly, but it also meant that McKinley's re-election became a severe
blow to the Filipino cause.134
While Aguinaldo was aware of the election season, he overestimated the chance
of McKinley losing the election. Aguinaldo also underestimated the American response
to increased insurgent activity. McKinley’s opponent William Jennings Bryan had lost
an election bid four years before, and his main platform had been about economics
centered on his "Free Silver" policy. His campaign now faced an incumbent president
who had overseen a successful war against Spain and a better economy than during the
last election. Bryan faced an uphill battle to win the election, and his main chance to
stand out from McKinley was his opposition to annexing the Philippines.
Unfortunately for Bryan, this position failed to resonate with many Americans.
Anti-imperialists in the U.S. protested the war, but they never held a majority position.
Aguinaldo had little opportunity to gain an accurate appraisal of the U.S. political
climate. His campaign to increase publicized attacks failed to achieve a meaningful
impact. Reporters tried to write on the increased attacks but the American military began
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strict censorship policies to ensure that word of any American losses stayed in the
Philippines. Army censors delayed reports, prohibited the use of the word "ambush," and
inflated their successes. One report cited that the army had captured 800 insurgents and
their firearms. When a reporter investigated further, he found that only 40 rifles had been
captured, and the Army added in any other weapons they found to the count. 135
As 1900 wore on the insurgents saw some hope for their campaign, but with
McKinley’s victory, a positive outcome became impossible. The Americans had been
able to defeat the revolutionary army in battle, but not end the insurgency. Despite an
ongoing adherence to "benevolent assimilation" and its building programs, new roads,
schools, public health campaign, and civil administration, the American campaign was
far from over. It still could not prevent widespread insurgent support or attacks. Even if
these attacks could not end the American occupation, they prevented full American rule.
To implement American governance of the islands, McKinley dispatched the
Philippine Commission under future President William Taft. When Taft arrived in June at
the head of the commission, his purpose was to provide the Filipinos with an effective
civilian government. Initially, the commission assumed legislative power in the islands.
As the military declared provinces to be "pacified" they would be handed over to the
authority of the commission until the entirety of the Philippines was under civilian
governance and Taft would become governor of the territory. 136
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In the meantime, Taft repeatedly clashed with the military and General Arthur
MacArthur, now head of the army in the Philippines. Each side resented sharing
authority with the other and had different views on how to end the war. Taft’s optimistic
outlook on the conflict and paternal view of the Philippines also stood against the way
that many American soldiers viewed Filipinos. After Taft had referred to Filipinos as
“Our little brown brother” soldiers created new lyrics for a then popular tune to explain
their feelings.
“I’m only a common soldier man in the blasted Philippines, They

say I got Brown Brothers here, but I dunno what it means. I like the word
Fraternity, but I still draw the line; He may be a brother of William H.
Taft, but he ain’t no friend of mine.”137
This soldierly view of the Filipinos echoed sentiments of American officers as
well. From top to bottom, the American military in the Philippines did not trust the new
civilian administration to get the job done and viewed most of the population with
mistrust or as outright collaborators with the insurgency.
INSURGENCY REVEALED
As the insurgents carried out more direct attacks on American troops and outposts
during their election season offensive, Americans began to realize that they needed to
change their approach. MacArthur himself suspected that the majority of Filipinos were
loyal to the insurgency. Much of the insurgent support relied on intimidation or force.
Filipinos who were willing to stop supporting the insurgency and provide their loyalty to
the Americans needed protection. If Americans could not provide some measure of
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security and support to those loyal to their cause, they would never be able to end the
war. Taft concluded after his initial tour of the islands that most civilians wanted peace
but feared reprisals.
Taft’s view differed from MacArthur, who still assumed that civilians would
provide spoken loyalty to the Americans and get the benefits that their loyalty entailed,
while still maintaining active support for the insurgency. The reasons that American
officials and officers could look at the Philippines and come away with such different
conclusions was due in part to the regional differences in the provinces, but much more
important, until the summer of 1900, few on the American side had a clear understanding
of how the insurgency operated.
That changed in June 1900 when Lieutenant William Johnston sent a report to
MacArthur titled “Methods Adopted by Insurgents for Organizing and Maintaining a
Guerrilla Force.” This report contained the information from several months of
investigation and work by Johnston in the province of La Union. La Union was located in
Northwestern Luzon 170 miles from Manila. Johnston suspected more to the insurgency
than a few local bands and that they needed support to stay in the field. He began a
thorough investigation and soon started to learn about the shadow government operating
in areas previously thought pacified. Johnston used a local cult leader that had strained
ties to the insurgency to begin naming figures in the resistance. Johnston first used his
informant to uncover insurgent officers and stockpiles in the town of Bauang. The
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network he had started to uncover showed Johnston that the insurgent government had
been operating within American controlled areas with relative impunity.138
Johnston learned that insurgents had infiltrated many levels of civil government
even in those towns that had significant numbers of American troops. He also found out
that they gained supplies and taxes from the local population and by skimming from
American aid. His intelligence showed that insurgent bands often camped by local
towns, even those with American garrisons to enforce the authority of this shadow
government and that even high-ranking insurgent leaders could move in and out of
American-controlled areas. In La Union, this information was both a shock and finally a
means to combat the insurgency effectively. Johnston used the original cult-leaderturned-counterinsurgent to recruit a Filipino volunteer force, which consisted initially of
mostly his cult followers, to begin naming and arresting suspected insurgents.139
Those arrested could prove their loyalty to the Americans by turning over more
information or former comrades, which provided more intelligence to the Americans and
guaranteed that the prisoner could not rejoin the insurgency. The Americans appointed
loyal Filipinos to the important civil positions and regained control in towns that had
previously served as safe havens for the shadow government. In the course of a few
months, the province had been declared pacified. MacArthur received the report in June
and made the decision that American strategy needed to change. He also recognized that
a public acknowledgment of the American failure to finish a war that had seemed to be
won a few months before would give fodder to rising anti-imperial sentiment back home.
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MacArthur knew that he needed to wait until after the election to enact the harsh measure
he now thought necessary to end the war. Anti-imperialist voices back home faced strong
opposition from those that supported the war, annexation, and McKinley. They were
labeled unpatriotic and accused of aiding the insurgency. The New York Tribune even
attacked William Jennings Bryan by saying that “Every American soldier killed during
these months can be laid directly at his door.”140
Following McKinley’s victory in the 1900 election, MacArthur began to
implement a new strategy in the Philippines. This new effort, based on Lt. Johnston’s
work, represented a major shift from a “policy of attraction”141 that had been the overall
American strategy until this point. MacArthur’s strategy took a hard turn. He outlined
that static garrisons would continue to protect important towns, but additional more
mobile forces were to be assigned to conduct sweeps of insurgent territory to root out the
bands still fighting the Americans. Also, the Americans began to recruit more native
auxiliaries to supplement their manpower. This new push began in December, after the
election, but this reorganization of American efforts represented only part of the change
that MacArthur implemented in the fall of 1900.142
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The legal basis for MacArthur’s shift was the Lieber Code, also known as General
Orders 100.143 Since the beginning of the war American forces had been operating under
this standing order which dated to U.S. Civil War. While official American policy during
the Philippine-American War had been "Benevolent Assimilation", the Army had been
operating under G.O. 100. The dichotomy between official policy and local enforcement
created a situation where commanders operated under their interpretation of the order,
and how to make it fit with the broader policy of attraction. In practice, many
commanders resorted to the punitive sections of G.O. 100 to combat the insurgents, while
the American command in Manila officially practiced attraction. In late December,
MacArthur issued a proclamation to the Philippine people and his men that the
Americans were now using the full measure of the G.O. 100. This shift bridged the gap
between official and de facto policy and made it clear that anyone who still opposed the
Americans faced intense repercussions.144
A lawyer named Frances Lieber wrote General Orders 100 during the Civil War
in 1863. Lieber’s code became the first documented “laws of war.” The document was
meant to be a standing order that governed the Union Army and laid out standards of
conduct for both combatants and noncombatants. When Lieber wrote G.O.100 the
hostile territory and enemy combatants were the Confederates in the American South,
now the hostile forces were the Filipino insurgents. G.O. 100 especially focused on the
treatment of anyone operating as a guerrilla and their supporters. The punishment for this
kind of warfare could be stringent, including summary executions, and Lieber made clear
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that guerrillas were not to be treated as enemy soldiers. Anyone that aided guerrillas
could have their property destroyed. MacArthur released the proclamation to give notice
that remaining insurgents were in violation of the laws of war as written in General Order
100. He had offered an amnesty during the summer that had failed to net any major
leaders of the insurgency, and he sought to use G.O. 100 as the harsh alternative.145
Some American officers had already used General Order 100 as justification for
harsh policies. American forces resorted to burning crops and homes, arresting suspected
insurgents, or even shooting suspected saboteurs on sight. For those officers that had
been employing these tactics, the announcement came as a tacit acceptance that they had
been right. For others, it came as the signal to begin waging a hard war on the insurgents,
some of whom had believed that once the war was over their lives could return to normal
with their status or property unharmed. Ultimately the goal of the new policy was not
just to bring destruction to the Philippines for resisting the Americans, but to separate the
active insurgents from any base of support, and to force those Filipinos in the middle to
actively pledge their loyalty to the Americans. By implementing stern measures,
MacArthur hoped to make the consequences of continued resistance too great. Lieber's
stated goal of General Orders 100 was to achieve peace. To bring peace MacArthur
decided to destroy the insurgent's support network, not just to convince the population of
America’s ability to govern the Philippines, as had been the main object of the policy of
attraction. 146
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The beginning of 1901 saw the full force of this new strategy begin to have an
impact on the islands. MacArthur centered his efforts and his 70,000 troops on the main
island of Luzon. He assumed that bringing an end to the insurgency on the largest island
would have a domino effect on the rest. Along with more aggressive soldiering, the new
year saw the rise of the Filipino Federalist Party. The Federalist Party formed from
Filipino elites that had decided that the way forward was to recognize American
sovereignty in the Philippines. They began a campaign to persuade fellow Filipinos to
their cause and offered an alternative means of political representation for those outside
of the Aguinaldo's government. Their belief that the U.S. had won was both pragmatic,
as they recognized the fact that anyone who continued to resist would be kept out of the
postwar government, and patriotic as they still believed in a potential political
independence for the Philippines.147
Throughout the beginning of the new year of 1901 support for the insurgents
began to erode. MacArthur's efforts, American reinforcements, and Mckinley's election
combined to wear down the insurgents. Between December 1900 and July 1901,
resistance ended in twenty-one of the thirty-eight provinces that still held out against the
Americans. Where efforts before had failed to bring in insurgent leaders, they too began
to capitulate. To drive home the point and to signal the end of the war was close at hand
the Army launched a raid to capture Aguinaldo.148
Aguinaldo had been in hiding since the defeat of the Revolutionary Army and his
decision to transition to guerrilla warfare. He tried to manage the insurgency from a
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hidden headquarters in the mountains of northern Luzon. However, he could only
manage to exercise limited command and control of his forces through written
communications to subordinates and proclamation to the Filipino people. With
communications already difficult for insurgents, Aguinaldo’s influence over his
commanders waned. The conflict became much more regionally focused once the
Filipinos began their guerrilla campaign, yet Aguinaldo was still an important symbol for
Filipinos who still believed they could win independence.
His capture began with a courier. In January of 1901, an insurgent messenger
asked a mayor that had been part of the shadow government for safe passage past the
Americans. Unfortunately for the messenger and the insurgency, the mayor was now
loyal to the Americans. With the mayor’s help, American forces captured the messenger
who was carrying about twenty letters. Among the letters was a request from Aguinaldo
to his cousin that asked for reinforcements to bolster his headquarters in Palanan. The
location was the final piece the Americans needed to strike, and Aguinaldo's need for
reinforcements provided the means. With this information, American Brigadier General
Fred Funston formulated a plan to capture the insurgent leader.149
Funston had won the Medal of Honor two years before, when, during the Battle of
Calumpit he led twenty-two volunteers from his Kansas regiment to take an enemy
position by crossing a river under fire.150 His plan to capture Aguinaldo needed all of his
bravery. Funston, along with four other American officers, were to be led as “prisoners”
by 80 Macabebe Scouts dressed and armed as insurgents. A gunboat deposited them
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within insurgent territory and they proceeded to march 100 miles to Aguinaldo’s
headquarters. To aid in their raid, Funston forged two letters on captured insurgent paper
that appeared to have been written by a Filipino commander that Aguinaldo trusted.
During the march, Funston relied on several ex-insurgents to lead the way and help fool
any actual insurgents they came across. When Funston’s force arrived, the ruse worked.
Aguinaldo turned out his honor guard to greet them. The Macabebes formed up opposite
the honor guard and instead of firing a salute opened fire on the guards. As the volley
erupted, one of the ex-insurgent officers ran to capture Aguinaldo, shooting two more of
his guards in the process. Among MacArthur’s staff some officers thought the raid
would end in disaster, but instead, it was a complete success. Funston had captured
Aguinaldo and made the rendezvous with the gunboat to return to MacArthur’s
headquarters.151
Aguinaldo’s capture did not end the war, but it did cause some important guerrilla
leaders to surrender along with some of their men. Aguinaldo’s capture represented a
definite success for the Americans in an often-frustrating war without tangible victories.
For many insurgents though, Aguinaldo was too remote of a symbol for them to give up
the fight. They had been loyal to their local commanders before his capture and
continued to be. If the local commanders fought on then so did their men. The
conclusion of the war fell to MacArthur’s successor, Adna Chaffee.152
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CHAPTER THREE: HARD WAR
When Chaffee assumed command in July of 1901, he wanted to begin a more
thorough transfer of power to the Philippine Commission. Initially, he maintained the
policies that had been successful under MacArthur. However, Chaffee felt that the Army
still occupied too many areas and that his troops needed to be released from pacification
to be better used in fighting the remaining hotspots of the insurgency. Two insurgent
strongholds remained, in the province of Batangas and on the island of Samar. Although
the change in tactics brought about by MacArthur had been withering for the Filipinos,
several strong groups of insurgents, including those on Samar and in Batangas, still held
out against American rule.153
Chaffee had joined the Army at the outbreak of the Civil War as a private. By
1864 he was a Second Lieutenant as part of General Sheridan’s command. Sheridan’s
campaign through the Shenandoah Valley that year targeted both the Confederate Army
and the supplies that they used. Union forces undertook a campaign to destroy anything
that could be of use to their enemies to try and speed up the end of the war. Chaffee was
familiar with hard war and his mandate to defeat the insurgency had a similar basis. He
allowed his commanders to use the harshest measures mandated under G.O. 100 to end
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the war as soon as possible and James Franklin Bell would be one of the top picks to
implement Chaffee's strategy.154
As Chaffee took over in the late summer of 1901, the Philippine-American War
looked to be finally nearing an end. MacArthur’s tenure in the islands saw a major
intelligence breakthrough and widespread dismantling of the insurgency. The years of
war had shaped the American Army into an effective counter-insurgency force.
Although at times thrust into roles and missions that it had not anticipated, the Army had
adapted well to this method of war. For James Franklin Bell this war had been a chance
to finally advance in rank, and he had proven to be an excellent officer. His tenure in the
Philippines had led to a rise to the rank of Brigadier General. He had fought the
insurgency all over the islands and at nearly every level of command. His knowledge of
counter-insurgency warfare, built on U.S. Army history, doctrine, and his experience in
the Philippines would be vital to the success of his coming campaign in Batangas
province.
The event that precipitated Bell's assignment occurred on September 27th, 1901.
Filipino insurgents infiltrated the town of Balangiga on the Island of Samar and surprised
the American garrison in an early morning attack. The residents of the town aided the
insurgents who were only armed with knives that they had smuggled into Balangiga
leading up to the assault. Tensions in Balangiga had been high recently between the
soldiers and Filipinos. The new garrison commander, Captain Thomas Connell, had
received several allegations of rape against his soldiers and had been forcing the Filipinos
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to clear underbrush and debris from the town. In addition to these tensions, the island
was in the middle of the Cholera outbreak. This outbreak provided cover for the
insurgents to smuggle knives into the town.
The night before the attack American sentries noticed residents carrying an
unusual number of caskets into the church. When they checked, the Filipinos told the
Americans that the caskets contained recent Cholera victims. The excuse, combined with
Connell’s recent warnings against aggravating the already high tensions was enough for
the American sentries to allow the “funeral” to continue.155
The unit assigned to garrison Balangiga was Company C of the 9th U.S. Infantry
Regiment. Company C had previously fought in the Philippines and then in the Boxer
Rebellion in China before its assignment to garrison Balangiga. On the morning of
September 27, 1901, most men of this veteran unit were eating breakfast when the town’s
police chief shot the armed sentry with his own rifle; the remaining soldiers were
unarmed. After killing the sentry, insurgents rang the church bell to signal the all out
attack on the American garrison.156
Although the Filipinos attacked only with knives and bolos, they had the element
of surprise. Since many of the American soldiers were away from their rifles, the
fighting was hand to hand combat, with the Americans at a decided disadvantage.
American soldiers fought back with whatever they had available, including rocks and
reportedly even a baseball bat, but they had to fight their way to their rifles. The
Filipinos knew that to capitalize on the surprise, they needed to prevent the Americans
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from getting to their guns and detailed part of their attacking force to make sure of that.
Despite this, some soldiers did manage to make it to their guns and organize a fighting
retreat down to the shoreline. From there the survivors kept the Filipinos at bay while
they managed to get onto boats and make an escape.157
The Filipinos inflicted forty-eight deaths on the American garrison and probably
lost between twenty-five and thirty of their men. To the American Army in the
Philippines, the attack was a complete shock. For many Americans, in the summer of
1901, the war seemed nearly won. Efforts under MacArthur and Chaffee appeared to
have broken up the insurgent shadow government and forced the bands of insurgents that
were left to be always on the run, barely able to feed themselves, much less organize a
major attack against an American outpost.
Officials and soldiers quickly dubbed the attack the Balangiga Massacre.
Although the battle had been one-sided and had the galvanizing impact of a massacre to
the Americans, in reality, it was a well-organized insurgent assault planned to overcome
the American advantage in firepower. Unfortunately for the residents of Samar, the
distinction between battle and massacre was lost on the U.S. Army and the American
public. In newspapers back in America the attack was compared with Custer’s Last
Stand and labeled as treachery on the part of the Filipinos. Specific reprisal for the assault
at Balingiga was swift and decisive. An infantry company that included six of the
survivors returned to the town aboard a navy gunboat. When they arrived, they razed

157

Silbey, A War of Frontier and Empire, 2008, 191–93.

75

Balingiga. Their commander sent a matter of fact message back to Chaffee, “Buried
dead, burned town, returned Basey.”158
The shock of Balangiga caused a panic at the American headquarters in Manila.
American intelligence began reporting that the insurgents were preparing a new round of
uprisings for the beginning of 1902 just as they had during the American election season
of 1900. These Army intelligence reports and the attack at Balangiga stood in stark
contrast with the reports from Taft and the Philippine Commission that the insurgents
were nearly beaten. Chaffee sided with his intelligence service. To him, the war should
have been over by now, and the attack was a reminder that American policies had failed
so far to end the war. Chaffee reorganized the existing districts into brigade commands
and looked for officers to bring the war to a close.159
In reality, Taft’s assessment was correct, and the insurgency was close to being
defeated. While some insurgent bands remained in the field and tried to continue the
war, they had been doing so on ever shrinking resources. The attack at Balangiga did not
signal a revival of the insurgency. Unlike the increased attacks during the summer of
1900, this well-planned and executed attack marked the maximum effort that the
Filipinos could muster at this late stage of the war. The Balangiga Massacre was a last
gasp for the Filipinos, and it happened on Samar which was home to some of the last
holdouts of the insurgency. The shock of the attack resonated because Samar had earned
a reputation as a particularly challenging area for the Americans to subdue, and because
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the assault was the worst loss in a single engagement for the Americans in the entire
war.160
Chaffee had been in command since July and was familiar with hard war
campaigns. He was a Civil War veteran that had fought in General Sheridan's
Shenandoah Valley Campaign, and the Plains Wars. The attack on Balangiga led him to
authorize extreme measures to bring the war to an end. He had already recognized that
Batangas province, which Bell would command, was still hostile to American rule. To
defeat the insurgency on Samar, Chaffee picked General Jacob Smith. The campaigns
that Smith and Bell would wage had a new urgency following Balangiga. The extreme
measures that Chaffee authorized later led to a Senate inquiry that would bring
widespread negative publicity to the two campaigns and damaged the army’s
reputation.161
Jacob Smith was another Civil War veteran. He had been wounded at the Battle
of Shiloh, and the bullet remained in his hip for the rest of his life. He had damaged his
career through misconduct. Smith had improperly used recruiting bounties during the
Civil War and in the post-war Army, he had been subject to a court-martial which
eventually led to his conviction and sacking. Grover Cleveland saved his career, and
when war broke out with Spain, Smith received orders to Cuba. He suffered a bullet
wound at the Battle of El Caney and following his recovery he transferred to the
Philippines.
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It was in the Philippines that he earned his promotion to a Brigadier General as
the Philippines proved to be an opportunity for long withheld advancement. In light of
the Balangiga attack, Chaffee encouraged a harsh prosecution of the war in the hope that
it would bring about a quicker end. Whatever degree of harshness Chaffee authorized,
Smith implemented it even further. He ordered a complete blockade of the island and
forced inhabitants into reconcentration zones with anything outside these zones
considered a target. Smith became notorious for his quoted intent to turn Samar into a
“howling wilderness” and eventually, his actions on Samar required Chaffee’s personal
intervention to scale back the violence. One officer later wrote “We did not take any
prisoners. We shot everybody on sight.”162
Aside from Samar, the other area of the Philippines which still had an active
insurgency was the Second District, Department of the Southern Luzon. This region, not
far south of Manila, incorporated the provinces of Bataganas, Laguna, and Tayabas. As a
whole, the U.S. Army often referred to it as just the Batangas region or province, or more
widely, as Southern Luzon. These three provinces encompassed 4,200 square miles and
560,000 residents. Although the impact of the war damaged the area, the region was still
one of the wealthiest and most densely populated in the Philippines. The district had
been a hotbed of resistance to outside rule since the initial revolt against Spanish rule in
the 1890s. Many of the region’s wealthy citizens had pushed for reforms in Spanish rule
and began organizing a rebellion when these reforms failed to appear. For American
soldiers stationed here, it became one of the most difficult areas to control. The region’s
firm support of the revolution, its difficult terrain, propensity for torrential rains, along
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with the related mosquitoes and the diseases they carried, all combined to fight against
American pacification efforts. 163
BELL’S WAR
To finally end the war here Chaffee selected James Franklin Bell and appointed
him commander of the Third Separate Brigade. He stepped into command of the province
with the atmosphere of frustration and reprisal on many Americans minds. Bell had
recently been the Provost General of Manila and before that commanded the 36th U.S.
Volunteer Infantry Regiment in Pampanga Province, north of Manila. His plan for
Batangas was a blend of paternal humanitarianism and hard war philosophy learned from
the numerous campaigns that he had fought so far. He recognized the need to protect
those Filipinos loyal to American rule, but would approve a broad range of reprisals for
those who were not. Bell's campaign in Batangas was consistent with tactics American
forces had already employed in the Philippines, but his implementation would be a step
further and eventually became the most thorough pacification campaign of the entire
war.164
Bell had been an energetic and aggressive officer throughout his service in the
Philippines. As a Colonel of the 36th U.S. Volunteer Infantry, he had been awarded the
Congressional Medal of Honor for charging seven insurgents armed only with his pistol
and forcing three to surrender. The action had begun because Bell and his men could
hear heavy firing coming from a nearby town. Bell, along with some of his officers and
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scouts left ahead of the regiment to investigate, with the remainder of the regiment
following behind. Bell and the men with him encountered the enemy patrol and captured
all seven, and although two of the insurgents had been wounded, no one on either side
was killed in the close range exchange of fire. Throughout the record of the 36th Infantry
Bell appears leading patrols and attacks on enemy positions. Even at these earlier stages
of the war, Bell recognized the need to seize arms and capture insurgents, which would
become key during his command in Batangas.165
Bell was also widely recognized as the right officer for the job. Taft and others
praised Bell's previous success, and they also recognized the nature of Bell's coming
campaign. One member of the Philippine Commission wrote,
"He is sent to Batangas to make peace, and he proposes to do it even if the peace
which he establishes must be the peace of desolation. He seemed to be in a
somewhat reflective and subdued frame of mind in the presence of an undertaking
which may bring destruction to a once rich province and great suffering to a large
body of people. While the task is not of his choosing, it is clear that although he
may expect to be vilified and have to bear the responsibility of action in many
cases which he cannot control he seemed to have a deep determination to carry
out his orders and to end rebellion in Batangas."166

For his campaign in Batangas, Bell commanded the entire Third Separate
Brigade. The brigade consisted of 7,600 soldiers in two cavalry regiments and six
infantry regiments. In addition, Bell had nearly 700 Filipinos attached to the brigade as
native scouts. Bell's plans centered on controlling the population and the supplies
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available to the insurgents, particularly weapons, and on separating the insurgents from
their supporters in the local population.167
Opposing Bell was one of the best equipped and determined bands of insurgents.
It had been led by General Miguel Malvar in Batangas province and General Juan Cailles
in Laguna province since Aguinaldo’s proclamation of guerrilla war. Cailles had been
the commander that had handed the Americans their defeat at Matibac, second only to
Balangiga in the scale of American losses and one of the only instances in which Filipino
forces withstood an American assault. Although Cailles was instrumental in building the
insurgent network in this region by the summer of 1901 he had decided to surrender,
following Aguinaldo’s capture that spring. Despite Cailles and Aguinaldo's surrender,
and increasing pressure from former insurgents to accept American rule Malvar was
determined to continue his resistance.168
Malvar proved to be one of the best leaders the Filipinos fielded throughout the
war. His leadership was no small part in why the resistance continued for so long in the
region. Malvar was a wealthy native of Batangas who had begun organizing
revolutionary bands to fight the Spanish in 1896 and was known for his desire for
complete independence. Thanks to the efforts of Malvar and Cailles the Filipino
resistance in these provinces was among the best organized of the war. Malvar realized
that he could not win by trying to outfight the American Army and instead concentrated
his efforts on keeping control over the local population to deny the region to his
opponents. He relied on a strong network of local elites to lead the resistance and was
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willing to resort to force to keep civilians from switching sides. At least at the beginning
of the guerrilla war, the insurgency in Batangas had more uniform support from the local
populace than in many other regions. In many areas where the resistance struggled to
maintain the support of the residents, insurrectos in the second district could count on
more popular support based on the ethnic and cultural ties as well as the fact that the
region had been a homeland for the resistance since the original revolt against Spain.169
As American strategy in the Philippines shifted from Benevolent Assimilation to
counter-insurgency, American commanders began to realize they needed to attack the
means of insurgents to wage war, and not their motivations. If pacification had focused
on showing Filipinos what American rule could do to benefit them, then the turn to
counter-insurgency embodied in Bell expressed what awaited them if the insurgents
would not surrender. From the start of his campaign, Bell understood his mission as
bringing about peace through a hard war.170
The failure of the campaigns of attraction had been that they did not eliminate the
insurgent presence, and there would always be die hard fighters that would go on fighting
to hinder American progress. Leaders like Malvar sought independence and would keep
the war going as long as they were able. Bell understood that and attempted to attack
their means to keep fighting. Even the staunchest freedom fighters could not fight without
food, money, and arms.
Once the Americans realized that their policy of attraction had allowed the
insurgency to gain control of the civilian population, at least in those areas in which the
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insurgency was active, they also realized that no amount of public works projects could
get the civilians to change sides. The Americans relied on the civilian population for
intelligence and even manpower, and the insurgents needed them as their only real source
of supplies. If one side could isolate the civilians from the other, they could effectively
control a town or province, even if a large enemy force was present. For insurgents, they
isolated the civilians through intimidation and their shadow government. For Americans,
they did so by offering civilians protection, aid, or even threats. Bell understood this
dynamic as well as any American officer in the entire war. His campaign to end the
insurgency in Southern Luzon would be the most complete and efficient campaign of the
Philippine-American War.171
The American policies in the Philippines had always assumed the full right of
America to control the islands. In the mindset of the period America had gained the
islands legally through its peace treaty with Spain and America was the lawful authority
of the land. McKinley’s administration had delayed in coming up with a cohesive policy
towards the Philippines, and in some ways, the Army had defaulted into its role as civil
administrators and counter-guerrilla fighters.172
Bell's view on the United States’ right to be in the islands followed a similar
logic. When he assumed command of the Third Separate Brigade he argued as much in
his speech to his officers. Bell’s position was that Americans were the rightful rulers of
the Philippines and that the resistance to American rule was an insurrection. Because an
insurrection opposed lawful American rule, then the U.S. Army could implement
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measures to defeat it as outlined by General Orders 100. Bell’s tenure as commander was
not the first time the American military had made use of General Orders 100 during the
war, but Bell frequently cited sections of it in his orders to his command. Bell went so
far as to issue a copy of General Orders 100 to every officer in his brigade.173
When Bell spoke to his officers, he explained that he planned to make the
insurgents want peace. Bell viewed Batangas as the center of the insurgency. He clearly
outlined a plan to root out anyone that was helping the insurgents, in particular among the
Filipino elite. Bell suspected that the insurgency in the area under his command relied on
the support of local landowners and officials who benefited from continuing the
rebellion. By subjecting those who supported the insurgency to hardship and breaking
their contact with the insurgent forces Bell believed he could bring about an end to the
war. He understood his mission in Batangas to be forcing the insurgents to surrender and
bring about peace even if it meant hardship for the civilians and in fact by waging a hard
war could achieve peace more quickly.174
Following his speech to his officers, Bell began issuing telegraphic circulars to his
command. Bell distributed the circulars to all the stations under his command, and he
wrote them as standing orders for the duration of the campaign. Bell’s circulars outlined
the ways in which he intended to bring an end to the insurgency on an almost point by
point basis. If his speech to his officers was a summation of his philosophy, then his
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telegraphic circulars became the practical embodiment, although they often included
further justifications for the actions that Bell took.
Bell’s orders can be broken down into a few categories. Some dealt with specific
tactics to combat the insurgency and destroy their means to wage war. Other circulars
dealt with policing the garrisoned areas, mainly by targeting what Bell thought was the
biggest source of insurgent support, the wealthy citizens, and officials who had not
demonstrated loyalty to the Americans. In more mundane circulars Bell issued reminders
to his men to be vigilant or not to abuse the leeway he had given them in hunting
insurgents. Bell's campaign began shortly after, and was concurrent with, Smith’s
excesses on Samar, and Bell had previously acknowledged the extremes to which his men
had gone to gain information from insurgents. He certainly had some reason to worry
about further incidents causing problems in his command.175
The final category which encompasses a significant amount of Bell’s circulars
deals with food. Bell saw the food supply in the provinces under his control as part of the
means of the insurgents to wage war. If he could attack and destroy their food supply, he
could bring a quicker end to the conflict. In essence, siege out the entire region to starve
the insurgency into submission. It was not his only tactic, but it played a role in his
overall plan to end the insurgency. As militarily sound as this might have been, it soon
caused problems for the civilian population, and many of his orders reflect a growing
food shortage because of the American campaign.
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Before Bell could secure the insurgent's supply caches and food, he had to isolate
their supporters. The keystone to Bell’s plan for Southern Luzon and the most
controversial of his orders was Circular Number Two. In it, Bell officially ordered all of
the civilians in the area of the Third Brigade to be relocated into American-controlled
towns.176 From his second circular dated December 8th, 1901,
"In order to put an end to enforced contributions, now levied by
insurgents upon the inhabitants of sparsely settled an outlying barrios and
districts, by means of intimidation and assassination, commanding officers
of all towns now existing in the provinces of Batangas and Laguna,
including those at which no garrison is stationed at present, will
immediately specify and establish plainly marked limited surrounding
each town bounding a zone within which it may be practicable, with an
average size garrison, to exercise supervision over and furnish protection
to inhabitants (who desire to be peaceful) against the depredations of
armed insurgents. These limits may include the barrios which exist
sufficiently near the town to be given protection and supervision by the
garrison and should include some ground on which livestock can graze,
but so situated that it can be patrolled and watched. All ungarrisoned
towns will be garrisoned as soon as troops become available.
Commanding officers will also see that orders are at once given and
distributed to all the inhabitants within the jurisdiction of town over which
they exercise supervision, informing them of the danger of remaining
outside of these limits and that unless they move by December 25th from
outlying barrios and districts with all their movable food supplies,
including rice, palay, chickens, livestock, etc., to within the limits of the
zone established at their own or nearest town, their property (found
outside of said zone at said date) will become liable to confiscation or
destruction."177
This second circular was Bell’s clear message on how he intended to wage the
coming campaign. The order laid out how his soldiers would separate friend and foe.
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Each town in the province was turned into a fortified garrison with clear limits that
established an American zone of control around the given town. Americans forced the
Filipinos to move into these garrisons or “reconcentration zones.” Any person that stayed
outside the zones would be in danger, and any property could be seized or destroyed.
This tactic was not without precedent, both by American troops, and other
colonial powers as well. The British had built concentration camps during the AngloBoer War, and the Spanish had used them Cuba.178 The term carries more weight to a
post-World War Two audience, a more fitting term from modern usage might be
internment camps. Whatever the name, the American public reviled the camps. Their
use by Spain had been widely denounced in the United States, and the Spanish General
Weyler had received his nickname of “Butcher Weyler” in part for his use of
reconcentration camps. Chaffee considered Bell's policy so potentially damaging that he
asked for the letter about it to Secretary Root to be destroyed.179 When the American
public found out about their use in the Philippines, there were loud outcries and observers
noted the similarities between Bell's actions and Weyler's policies in Cuba.180
As many as 170,000 civilians may have died in Weyler's camps. Weyler, who
had admired General Sherman, dismissed the idea that his camps were unusually harsh,
and he used the American Civil War as an example. When asked by Fitzhugh Lee about
his camps, Weyler responded, "Everything is fair in war."181 A Spanish ambassador to
Washington cited Sheridan's and Sherman's campaigns in the Civil War, and the
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"Burning of entire cities, the ruin and devastation of immense and most fertile regions, to
the annihilation of all goods of the adversary."182
American garrisons formed the camps from existing towns and garrisons.
Soldiers forced outlying civilians to move into towns under American control. Bell
allowed garrison commanders to implement the order to their discretion, and there was
variance from town to town, often based on the capability of the garrison and the history
of that town. In quiet areas of the province that had seen limited or even no fighting the
Filipinos had much more freedom to be out of the camps during the day. Towns with
particularly small garrisons, often the same places as the previous example, were
unofficially allowed to go without rounding up all the inhabitants from the surrounding
countryside and continue their duties as before.183
Despite these exceptions, civilians tightly packed the zones with simple shacks
hastily built to accommodate the massive influx of residents. This order ostensibly
protected inhabitants from insurgent forces, but it had other desired outcomes as well.
With it, Bell created a clear line of friend or foe for his soldiers. American soldiers
measured the limits of the zones in hundreds of yards, effectively rifle range, and labeled
these lines as a "dead line.”184 Anyone found beyond the line was subject to be arrested
or even shot without question. People within the zones were at least publicly not
insurgents and guaranteed protection from insurgent retaliation. To American soldiers,
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anyone that remained outside the zones was an insurgent or potentially supporting
them.185
Bell’s tactics, used by other American officers in Samar has parallels in modern
wars as well, just as his hard war has parallels to previous conflicts. It was to be a “war
among the people”, much like the ones the French experienced in Indochina and Algeria,
or the British in Malaysia. If NATO had a “shape, clear, hold, and build” formula to
fighting in Afghanistan186, then Bell’s slogan could have been “shape, clear, hold, and
burn.”
Bell’s separation of the population and insurgents created kinds of safe zones for
his soldiers where they could operate in relative security in their garrisons and affect
control over the civilian population. This tactic was not without precedent and it has
been used since. The British used concentration camps against the Boers, and during the
Vietnam War, American and South Vietnamese forces relocated civilians into protected
villages in an attempt to separate enemy combatants from the population.187
In addition to making the rules of engagement outside the garrisons simpler, the
order also moved the insurgent supply base out of their control. The insurgents had been
living off the supplies they could get from locals and moving the locals inside American
controlled areas meant that Bell now controlled the main food supply. Americans
destroyed any supplies that they did not bring inside the zones, leaving the insurgents to
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live off a land that been wiped clean of supplies. The American troops in Batangas began
a thorough effort to destroy anything that was left in the countryside that could be used
by insurgents. Filipinos left buildings, crops, livestock, and whatever other supplies they
could not bring. Soldiers gathered up and burned whatever was left in the countryside.
In one of the first expeditions of the new year, which lasted just over a week, Bell's men
destroyed 1400 tons of rice and palay, killed 200 carabaos, 800 cattle, 680 horses, and
burned 6,000 homes.188
This aggressive campaign later caused problems for the population of Batangas.
As Bell’s command of the province went on, the civilian population began to experience
major food shortages. Filipinos attempted to grow crops in and around the now crowded
towns, but could not provide enough food to replace all that the Americans destroyed.
Despite its negative impact on civilians, it proved effective against the insurgents, for
without farmers to aid them, they had to forage what little food they could find, leaving
them malnourished and having to spend much of their time searching for food.189
The policy offered another benefit for Americans. It allowed American troops to
better protect Filipinos who had proved their loyalty to the American government.
Insurgents had targeted not just American troops, but also people suspected of working
with the Americans. The inability to protect loyal Filipinos created a problem, and
Americans had to show that they could enforce their rule and protect anyone willing to
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declare loyalty to the United States. Bell sought to remove the fear of reprisal from
Filipino civilians so that they would work with the Americans.190
Conditions in the camps varied in some degree from town to town. In some,
farmers could leave to harvest crops, others had much tighter control, and farming was
limited plots of land to grow crops within the zones. The civilian population in the area
under bell's command was around 300,000. One town grew from 5,000 to 30,000, the city
of Lipa held 43,000. These dense populations became susceptible to disease, which was
exacerbated by major food shortages brought on by the destruction of large stores of food
by American troops. Between January and May, 1902 over 11,000 Filipinos died in
Batangas. While these deaths were not the direct result of American action, Bell's
policies certainly contributed to them.191
In Circular Number Three Bell blamed the population of Batangas for the
continuation of the conflict. He believed that most of the Filipinos supported the
insurrection while claiming to want peace. He was enacting his orders to, "Make the
people want peace and want it badly."192 This circular was a clear statement about his
philosophy of a hard war to bring about peace. He went on to write, "A short and severe
war creates in the aggregate less loss and suffering than benevolent war indefinitely
prolonged."193
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Circular Three was one of the longest Bell issued and goes on to detail the way in
which Bell planned to break up the insurgent network. He told his men to make use of a
network spies, loyal police, native scouts and provost courts to break up the insurgent
network and to put pressure on the wealthy Filipinos and officials suspected of aiding the
insurgency.194
Although Circular Four has received less attention than his circular detailing
reconcentration, it shows the extreme limit to which Bell was willing to go to prosecute
this war. In it, Bell laid out a list of charges against the Filipino combatants and alleged
crimes against the laws of war and the U.S. government, specifically in violation of G.O.
100. The crimes included assassination, killing American wounded, booby traps,
intimidation of civilians, violating pardons, and treason. Because of these violations, Bell
authorized executions in retaliation for any assassination against an American or loyal
Filipino. Any execution was to be specifically for retaliating against an assassination by
insurgents and was conducted by picking a prisoner by lot, preferably one from the town
where an assassination had happened.195
In the following circular, Bell authorized another form of retaliation. Station
commanders could burn down Filipino property equivalent to whatever the insurgents
destroyed of American property. They were encouraged to burn down property that
belonged to Filipino officials that Americans suspected of aiding the insurgents. Bell
specifically recommended numbering the telegraph poles in each district and assigning
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each one to a Filipino. If insurgents destroyed a telegraph pole, it would be the
responsibility of that individual to repair it.196
Insurgents had made use of terror and intimidation to keep civilians loyal that
included public assassinations of those known to support the Americans. In the war, both
sides showed a willingness to resort to intimidation and terror as a means of coercion.
Both sides needed civilian support and used force to gain it when other means failed.197
Bell also reinstated a Spanish law requiring labor as a tax imposed on the local
population. Filipinos could also pay three pesos to get out of the labor requirement, but if
they could not then they were required to work for the Americans to repair roads, bridges,
and telegraph lines. Bell eventually authorized the money raised from this tax to pay for
food and used the labor to repair roads. He restricted movement and trade between
towns. Bell also issued an order to disarm the native police, which was separate from the
native auxiliary scouts the U.S. Army had been using effectively. Bell suspected the
police in many towns of having ties to the insurgency and suspected them of smuggling
arms and money to Malvar's forces.198
Bell made arms a primary objective of his campaign and authorized his men to
pay up to thirty pesos for a serviceable firearm. At the same time, the reward for an
officer’s capture was only five or ten pesos depending on their rank. Later on, Bell
reminded his men that they should take any weapon even it was not serviceable by the
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army’s standards. He went so far as to encourage his men to pay up to twenty pesos for
shotguns and revolvers, weapons which were not commonly used against American
forces, as a way to get more Filipinos to turn in firearms. The emphasis had been a part
of Bell’s time as a regimental commander and had been a major objective for American
forces throughout the war. Bell also ordered that all native horses were to be turned in
and accounted for and that even his men could not use them unless authorized. He
ordered Filipinos to turn in their bolos and knives, except for a few more peaceful areas
where they could have them dulled by a blacksmith instead. These were all means with
which an insurgent could fight back against the Americans and Bell placed a clear
priority on capturing as many weapons as he could.199
Throughout Bell’s circulars, he issued general reminders to his troops and
warnings to the Filipinos. While these are somewhat less specific, they continue to show
Bell’s intent and reasoning. He reminded his men to be vigilant and always armed, and
he wrote that he expected his orders would cause a strong response. He was obviously
aware of the potential for another Balangiga, even going so far as to cite that attack
specifically as a warning to his men. He wanted to avoid any opportunity for the
insurgency to gain a victory. He also warned the Filipinos that if a town did rise up
against its garrison that it would be completely burned. The warnings to his men and the
Filipinos mimic the attack at Balangiga for a reason, the American’s there were caught
without weapons and the retaliatory burning the town was well known by this point.200
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In all of his circulars, Bell assumed the guilt of the Filipinos of violating G.O. 100
and that they all likely had supported the insurgency to some degree during the war.
Therefore all Filipinos bore at least some of the responsibility for what was now
happening. There was clearly an impact on all of the Filipinos within Bell’s command.
Bell's campaign severely compounded existing food shortages. Bell recognized the
public health problem his campaign created and began a public vaccination campaign that
eventually vaccinated nearly the entire population of Batangas.201 Bell also issued some
of his circulars in direct response to the food shortages and sought to import rice to help
alleviate the humanitarian crisis. Bell eventually allowed Filipinos to accompany
American patrols so they could find and bring back food for themselves.202
Bell’s campaign in Batangas was not just limited to concentration and martial
law. He also ordered his commanders to send out patrols constantly searching for
insurgent bands. Bell’s forces pursued Malvar's bands far into insurgent territory. By
late February what remained of Malvar's army was close to capitulation with only a few
bands left in the field along with Malvar himself. To speed up to the defeat of insurgent
forces, Americans also began to put captured insurgents on trial for violations of G.O.
100 unless they gave the Americans useful service or intelligence, which usually resulted
in the capture of more insurgents, weapons, or supplies.203
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Bell clearly articulated his idea of a hard war in his many orders. In his early
orders, Bell stated his desire to bring about peace and to accomplish that he planned to
make continued resistance unbearable for the remaining insurgents. His later orders
contain many reminders to his soldiers to show restraint and not bring undue hardship on
the civilians around them. Despite his softening and realization of the problems that this
campaign had created, Bell remained committed to bringing about peace through a hard
war and his methods worked. Malvar and his remaining men surrendered at the
beginning of April. Malvar and his officers attributed the effectiveness of Bell’s
campaign to the reconcentration zones and Bell’s persistent pursuit of the insurgents.
One officer claimed that they could have kept fighting for three more years without
reconcentration. Malvar himself said at the time of his surrender that “I found myself
without a single gun or clerk…all my staff officers had already fallen into the hands of
the Americans.”204
Bell took command in December 1901. His first circulars were dated in midDecember, and by mid-April 1902 he had accepted Malvar’s surrender. It took him four
months to reduce one of the last strongholds of insurgent activity in the Philippines. With
Samar before it and now Batangas and the other provinces of Southern Luzon pacified,
the U.S. was able to claim that the war was over and in July of 1902 President Roosevelt
declared the war won. Sporadic fighting and even major campaigns continued long after
Roosevelt’s declaration. However, the war against anything that resembled a Filipino
national movement was over.
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Bell’s campaign had succeeded in bringing an end to resistance in Batangas by
enacting a hard war on the Filipino insurgents. He succeeded where commanders for two
years had failed to end the insurgency. He emerged from the war as one of the premier
counter-insurgency officers in the Army. His campaign had caused great hardship for the
civilians that lived through it and contributed to a dire humanitarian crisis both during
and afterward. Despite this, his campaign still stands as a success over an indigenous
guerrilla army. Bell’s circulars lay out a comprehensive counter-insurgency plan that
brought about an end to the war. His plan was based on his experience as well as the
previous half century of the U.S. Army’s campaigns and shared strategies with America's
European rivals. Because of the nature of the campaign and the Philippine-American
War, it has largely been forgotten or treated as a sideshow to American military history.
However, the Philippine-American War is linked to the long story of the U.S. Army,
most notably through Bell and the hard war that he waged in the spring of 1902.
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CONCLUSION
In Cheyenne, Wyoming, at the Francis E. Warren Air Force Base, there is a
reminder of the Philippine-American War, two of the Balangiga Bells. When American
troops returned to Balangiga following the Filipino attack, they sacked the town and took
the church bells as a prize. They stayed with the 9th Infantry Regiment for a time and one
of the three bells is still with the unit at its base in South Korea. The remaining two were
brought back to then Fort D.A. Russell by the 11th Infantry Regiment which had replaced
the 9th Infantry Regiment in garrisoning Balangiga. Officials from the Philippines have
asked for the bells to be returned on several occasions. Other church bells from the war
have been returned, but so far the Balangiga Bells have remained in U.S. hands.205 The
bells are a little-known reminder of the war in the same way that the war itself is
frequently a footnote to the Spanish-American War.
But the Philippine-American war, regardless of how well it is remembered, is an
important link in the history of the American way of war. As a conflict it shares many of
the traits and influences of those wars which historians debate more often. Just as the
Union entered the Civil War with a policy of reconciliation, the American government
began the Philippine war with a “policy of attraction.” While not completely alike, they

205

Edgar Allan M. Sembrano (contributor), “Return of San Pedro Bell Brings Hope for Balangiga Bells’
Repatriation,” June 6, 2016.

98

shared similar qualities in that enemy noncombatants were off limits, and their way of
life was to be left as undisturbed as possible in order to win them over. For the American
South in the Civil War, there were only limited initial incursions that sought to avoid
large scale destruction of property and economy. The harshest measures of G.O. 100,
adopted during the war for the very situation the Union encountered - fighting among
civilians in hostile territory - were not carried out to the fullest. In the Philippines, the
American policy of attraction in some ways went even further initially to avoid alienating
the Filipino population. The U.S. government actively tried to win popular support
among Filipinos through government programs and construction efforts.
Even when the war turned to stern measures, the U.S. showed some restraint.
Sherman’s March was limited in destruction to its immediate area; likewise, Sheridan’s
campaign through the Shenandoah Valley. Neither Sherman or Sheridan resorted to
wanton killing and they focused the destruction of goods on things useful to the Southern
war effort, which provided some measure of restraint to their raids.
When Bell began his own hard war, he imposed harsh measures on the Filipino
civilians that went beyond tactics employed during the Civil War. Two examples were
the large-scale relocation of the population and what amounted to free fire zones outside
of American garrisons. Even then, Bell showed at least some restraint, making efforts to
keep the population under his control fed and supplied. While the population suffered
from disease and many died, the American forces were not carrying out a program of
execution. When Bell’s orders brought about victory, civilians were allowed to return
home and rebuild. It may seem like a narrow distinction, but it is an important one.
Bell’s war was a hard war, not a war of annihilation.
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At the end of each conflict, civilian life was largely intact, although the loss of life
from famine was significant as a result of Bell’s campaign. In both the American South
and Batangas civilians lost goods and property on a large scale. At the end of the
conflict, they had the chance to resume their lives and in some cases emerged largely
unscathed.
His orders were designed to end the enemy’s capability to resist, not to bring
about full-scale destruction. It may be little comfort to those that suffered, but Bell’s
harsh orders combined with serious efforts at restraint are the hallmarks of a hard war and
distinct from a war of annihilation or total war. It was not the extirpative war of colonial
Americans against Native peoples, nor was it a limited war in which non-combatants
were off limits. Like others before and after, Bell’s commands showed willingness to use
military superiority to destroy the enemy’s capability to fight by exposing noncombatants
to danger and deprivation in order to end the conflict.
The American pacification campaign and Bell's campaign in Batangas were
ultimately fought as hard wars. There are two main caveats to that assessment. The first
is that is that the war was frequently balanced with the Army’s social programs, such as
school construction and public health programs.206 The second that the war was locally
fought with widespread differences. Two garrisons within just Bell’s area of command
may have carried out the war quite differently. Bell's orders demonstrate that he granted
his officers considerable leeway, especially in those areas without significant conflict.
However, even with these caveats, the essence of a hard war was still there. Bell’s
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campaign was not the only instance, but perhaps the clearest example. Just as Sherman
was willing to burn and destroy whatever might aid the Confederacy, Bell was willing to
burn and destroy whatever might aid the insurgents and to separate them from the
population that supported them. Bell’s war was one of hardship to end the war. He saw
hard war as the quickest path to peace, a peace that would only incorporate his enemies
once they capitulated.
The Philippine-American War was a counter-insurgency war. These kinds of
conflicts have dominated recent American military history. Twentieth and now twentyfirst-century armies have been plagued by the problem of counter-insurgency wars.207
Those conflicts are often frustrating and seemingly unwinnable. Yet, as Max Boot
claims, the Philippine-American War was “one of the most successful
counterinsurgencies waged by a Western army in modern times.”208 The U.S. Army,
through commanders like Bell, was willing to resort to hard war to achieve that success.
Yet in recent insurgencies like Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. has not resorted to a
hard war. For much of those conflicts, the U.S. military kept clear rules of engagement in
place in order to protect non-combatants. Even though these twenty-firstst century wars
share similarities to the Philippine-American War, the use of small local garrisons to
control as much territory as possible, an influx of soldiers to actively patrol and maintain
supply lines, and the uncertainty about who exactly was an enemy combatant, there were
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still clear limits. American and Coalition forces did not resort to targeting noncombatants as a strategy to win the war.
Perhaps the best examples of when U.S. forces were willing to cross that
threshold is to look to wars prior to the Philippine-American War, such as the campaigns
against Native Americans and the Civil War. Bell’s campaign is in essence another
example of the kind of warfare that Grenier explored in his book on Colonial and Early
American warfare against Native Americans.209 While Bell certainly did not aim to
annihilate the Filipino population, as English settlers were when dealing with Native
Americans, his tactics share more than just common themes with the extirpative wars
waged by colonists in early North America. In fact, after examining the PhilippineAmerican war in more detail, we have to accept that hard war is not the exception but the
main undercurrent that links conflicts from the early colonies until at least Bell’s
campaign in the Philippine-American War, and a number of recent U.S. conflicts in the
twentieth and twenty-first century.
Bell’s explanation of hard war through his telegraphic circulars match the tactics
that Sherman and Sheridan employed and embraced. Despite the Army’s efforts during
the nineteenth century to focus and prepare for an outward opponent - a possible British
or French invasion – it spent most of its time fighting what were then called small or
minor wars; what we would now call counter-insurgencies or unconventional wars. After
the War of 1812, the threat of European invasion never materialized again in the United
States. It served only as a theoretical exercise and the harbor forts that were built to
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counter such an invasion saw their only combat during the Civil War. Instead, the U.S.
Army primarily fought unconventional wars at home and abroad.210
As a military force, the U.S. Army became quite adept at fighting small wars, and
even during more conventional wars, it resorted to using the lessons learned from small
wars against major opponents, as Sherman and Sheridan proved. Those campaigns were
attacks on the opponent’s ability to continue fighting by pressuring noncombatants, a
hard war. They were larger in scale from the way of war practiced against Native
Americans, but relatable. Bell’s campaign in Batangas was not a leap or even an
evolution of the concept; it was a way of war he and the U.S. Army knew how to fight
and had long been fighting.
Bell was a career officer, a lieutenant only a few years before the outbreak of the
Philippine-American war. When he was tasked with defeating a capable insurgent force,
he resorted to a hard war. This strategy had begun with MacArthur and the intelligence
victories that uncovered the revolutionary shadow government and it was carried to its
fullest with Bell’s campaign in Batangas. It was a key to U.S. victory in the Philippines,
despite its toll on the Philippine population. As Bell and others saw it, this was the most
expedient way to end the war. Harsh but short, to avoid a prolonged conflict. It was a
way of war which showed up throughout American military history that would be
recognizable to both Bell’s predecessors and successors.
The Philippine-American War set the stage for many later American interventions
throughout the twentieth century. While it was not the first time the United States had
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ventured overseas militarily, it was the largest by a wide margin to that date. Once the
United States had exercised its imperial muscle it would do so again in Central and South
America in the 1920s and 1930s. While covert government operations to topple rulers
are somewhat removed from the Philippine-American War, it is impossible to ignore the
similarities between the conflict and many of the later wars America would fight. From
fortified villages in Vietnam to the remote outposts trying to catch up with under armed
insurgents in Afghanistan, America fought these kinds of wars before. America has
waged successful hard war for a long time, yet the modern attempts to fight insurgencies
have resulted in frustration, even with major campaigns to win local support and separate
the population from insurgents. The lesson from the Philippines is that America could
win these wars, but with a hammer that might not have a suitable modern nail.
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